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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
LAW QUARTERLY
Volume XXII JUNE, 1937 Number 4
THE SOURCE OF AUTHORITY FOR RULES OF
COURT AFFECTING PROCEDURE
TYRRELL WILLIAMSt
This article is divided into sections as here indicated. Section
1: The Scope of This Article. Section 2: What Is Procedure?
Section 3: What Are Rules of Court? Section 4: The Different
Functions of the Judiciary under a Typical American State Con-
stitution. Section 5: The Doctrine of Inherent Judicial Power
over Matters Ancillary to the Administration of Justice, but
Concurrent with Non-Frustrating Legislative Power. Section 6:
Certain Doctrines at Variance with the Doctrine Presented in
Section 5. Section 7: The Doctrine of Legislative Supremacy in
the Field of Procedure. Section 8: Constitutional Limitations on
the Doctrine of Legislative Supremacy. Section 9: The Doctrine
of Inherent and Exclusive Judicial Rule-Making Power in the
Field of Procedure. Section 10: The Doctrine of the Constitution-
ality of Statutes Granting to the Judiciary the Power to Make
Rules of Procedure in Contravention of Statutes.
SECTION 1: THE SCOPE OF THIS ARTICLE.
In a recent and illuminating article Commissioner Laurance
M. Hyde of the Missouri Supreme Court does four things. In
the first place he emphasizes an historical fact sometimes for-
gotten, namely, that the so-called rules of common-law procedure,
as formulated by Blackstone, Tidd and Chitty, which were ac-
tually applied by the common-law courts of this country during
the formative period of American jurisprudence, never were a
set of rules consciously and deliberately promulgated as cor-
t Professor of Law, Washington University.
1. Hyde, From Common Law Rules to Rules of Court (1937) 22 WASH-
INGTON U. LAW QUARTERLY 187.
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mands by courts in the same way that an ancient rule to show
cause was formulated by a court or as a modern rule to regulate
the filing of transcripts and briefs on appeal is formulated by a
court. Common-law rules in the early nineteenth century were
merely concise restatements of pre-existing principles. To quote
from Mr. Hyde's article:
"Our practice and procedure, as well as our substantive
law, came to us as a part of the common law of England. It
seems to be the popular impression that common-law pro-
cedure was judge-made procedure. It was, in fact, neither
a set of rules made by courts nor a code adopted by a legis-
lative body. Instead, it was a conglomeration of legislative
enactments, rules and orders of courts, ancient usages, and
judicial decisions; the haphazard growth of six centuries." 2
In the second place, Commissioner Hyde reminds us that in
this country dissatisfaction with the procedural defects of the
trans-atlantic common-law system led, during the middle decades
of the nineteenth century, to radical changes in procedure by
legislation. Many states adopted elaborate and detailed codes
or practice acts fundamentally changing the entire system, and
these codes have been recognized as binding upon the courts.
According to the prevailing theory in American states, the power
to change these formulated rules of procedure has remained in
the legislature and has been exercised only spasmodically. To
quote again from the article:
"Because the legislatures in this country, which enacted
these new codes, retained the exclusive right to make any
changes therein, our codes have remained to this time sub-
stantially the same as then enacted."3
In the third place, Commissioner Hyde describes in detail and
with proper attention to historical developments the modern
English function of procedural rule-making through a Rules
Committee consisting of judges, barristers and solicitors, cre-
ated by Act of Parliament, whose rules when promulgated must
be laid before Parliament and may by that body be annulled-
although apparently this power of annulment has never been
exercised by Parliament.
Finally, Commissioner Hyde compares the prevailing Amer-
2. Op. cit., p. 187.
3. Op. cit., p. 187.
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ican system of static legislative codes, necessarily difficult of
modification, with the dynamic English system of rules promul-
gated by a perpetual committee functioning as an arm of the
judiciary, and charged with the constant duty of seeing to it that
the rules of procedure are adjusted to the actual needs of a
changing society. This final phase of the article is the most elabo-
rately treated, and the entire article, obviously written from a
practical American viewpoint, is clearly intended as a plea for
judicial rule-making power with respect to procedure in this
country and for an abandonment of the purely legislative treat-
ment of all efforts for direct procedural modification.
In the course of his article Commissioner Hyde touches upon
a doctrine frequently advanced in the table talk of lawyers and
occasionally advanced in legal periodical literature and judicial
opinions.4 This is the doctrine that the supreme court of a typical
American state, by virtue of the constitutional division of all
governmental power into three branches, by virtue of its appel-
late jurisdiction at common law and in equity, and by virtue of
its power of superintending control, has an inherent power to
prescribe rules of procedure even in derogation of legislative
enactment. Says Commissioner Hyde:
"It is now being urged that our courts may change our
procedural codes without legislative authority. Whether
this is true or not, consideration of the English govern-
mental system makes it immediately apparent why an act
of Parliament was necessary before English courts could
have power to change statutory rules of practice and pro-
cedure. Under our state and federal Constitutions providing
for separation of governmental functions into three coordi-
nate branches, whether the judicial department has this
power, without the consent of the legislative department, is
at least a different question. Following the precedent of the
English Parliament, American legislatures have always ex-
ercised authority to make or change procedural rules, and it
is not the purpose of this article to discuss its constitutional
basis."5
As to the existence or non-existence of such inherent judicial
power, to be exercised without any additional express constitu-
4. See references in Section 9 of this article.
5. Hyde, From Common Law Rules to Rules of Court (1937) 22 WAsH-
INGTON U. LAW QUARTERLY 187, 188.
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tional grant or any legislative delegation, and in contravention
of statutory enactments, Commissioner Hyde carefully refrains
from expressing his own opinion. His article is intended for an-
other purpose. The purpose of this present article is to consider
in the light of actual judicial decisions the possibility of plausibly
asserting that the supreme court of a typical American state can
in effect repeal the procedural statutes of that state, without a
prior grant of power by constitutional provision or legislative
enactment.
SECTION 2: WHAT IS PROCEDURE?
The most widely quoted American description of procedure is
found in Kring v. Missoui.6 It is as follows: "The word 'proce-
dure', as a law term, is not well understood, and is not found at
all in Bouvier's Law DiCtionary.7 Fortunately a distinguished
writer on Criminal Law in America has adopted it as the title to
a work of two volumes." ... He says: 'The term procedure is so
broad in its signification that it is seldom employed in our books
as a term of art. It includes in its meaning whatever is embraced
by the three technical terms, Pleading, Evidence and Practice.'
And in defining practice in this sense, he says: 'The word means
those legal rules which direct the course of proceeding to bring
parties into court and the course of the court after they are
brought in'; and evidence, he says, as part of procedure, 'signifies
those rules of law whereby we determine what testimony is to
be admitted and what rejected in each case, and what is the
weight to be given to the testimony admitted.'" This is about
the same as Jeremy Bentham's concept of adjective or procedural
law.9 While useful for many purposes, this concept of procedure
is not sufficiently exact for present purposes when we are con-
sidering the judicial rule-making power. Our modem idea of
procedure includes pleading and practice, but does not include
evidence which seems to be regarded as a part of substantive
law. "Rules of evidence constitute substantive law, and cannot
be governed by rules of court" even in a state where procedural
rule-making has been conferred on the supreme court by an act
6. 107 U. S. 221, 231, 2 S. Ct. 443, 452, 27 L. ed. 506, 510 (1883).
7. Ed. of 1867; not defined in ed. of 1883; is defined in ed. of 1897 and
ed. of 1914.
8. Bishop, Criminal Procedure, (1872) sec. 2.
9. 1 Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence (1827) 5, note by John S.
Mill, Editor.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol22/iss4/2
AUTHORITY FOR RULES OF COURT
of legislation.1" In this article procedure will be regarded as
including pleading and practice but not evidence.
The word practice is a vague term. It means that part of pro-
cedure which is not pleading. For immediate purposes it may
be helpful to point out that at present all principles of practice
may be classified in five groups according to the respective
sources of authority of the principles. The first group includes
those principles of practice which are based upon ancient deci-
sions of adjudicated cases, now a part of the common law of
procedure and rigid through stare decisis.". (After indictment
for a felony, a court can do nothing in the absence of the defen-
dant.) The second group includes those principles of practice
which are in the nature of constitutional provisions or statutory
enactments. (In a majority of states a trial judge cannot com-
ment on the evidence.) The third group, existing in England and
in a few, but not many, American states, includes those promul-
gated rules of court, which, by reason of an express constitu-
tional provision or legislative enactment, will supersede earlier
statutes and rules of law, if it conflict therewith. (In Colorado:
Rule 14b, restoring the English common law right of a tial
10. State v. Pavelich, 153 Wash. 379, 382, 279 Pac. 1102, 1103 (1929).
Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence (1898), 511, "A court is fre-
quently represented as passing on questions of evidence when in reality it
is dealing with some other branch, either of substantive law or procedure."
1 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) 16, [In equity] "there were a few variant
rules, often spoken of as rules of evidence, but really rules of procedure or
of substantive law,--as when in chancery parol evidence was admitted to
reform a deed." See also Wickes, The New Rule-Making Power of the
United States Supreme Court (1934) 13 Texas L. Rev. 1. There is a view
contra. For a description of procedure broad enough to include evidence,
see Sunderland, Character and Extent of Rule-Making Granted United
States Supreme Court (1935) 21 A. B. A. J. 404, 407. See also Callahan
and Ferguson, Federal Evidence Rules (1936) 45 Yale L. J. 622, 641-644.
The important question (at present academic) is this: Suppose a state
legislature should pass a statute delegating to the supreme court the power
to make rules of evidence which, when promulgated, would supersede con-
flicting common law and statutes. Would such a statute be an unconstitu-
tional attempt to delegate substantive law-making power? For suggestive
essays on procedure, see Arnold, Role of Substantive Law and Procedure in
the Legal Process (1932) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 618, and Cook, "Substance" and
"Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws (1933) 42 Yale L. J. 333.
11. Professor Sunderland has suggested that stare decisis ought never
to have "found its way into the procedural field." See one of his valuable
contributions to the literature of this subject, Progress Toward a Better
Administration of Justice (1933) 17 Jour. Am. Jud. Soc. 49, 51. In England
the old mistake (if it was a mistake) has been corrected by a legislative
transfer of superstatutory rule-making power to the courts.
19371
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judge to comment on the evidence.) 12 The fourth group includes
those principles of practice which are in the nature of promul-
gated rules of court, subordinate to statutes and principles of
case law. (In many trial courts: no case shall be set down for
trial on the first day of the term.) The fifth group includes un-
recorded principles based on custom and usage. (At the opening
of court attorneys should remain standing until the judge is
seated.)
During the century following the American Revolution, both
in England and in this country, the importance of the fifth group
was greatly diminished. This was probably due to the constant
tendency in both England and this country to give up judicial
discretion for legal certainty. By the passage of statutes, by
judicial decisions in reviewing courts, and in England by the
adoption of superstatutory rules of court, the first, second and
third groups of principles were, in 1880, larger and more signi-
ficant than those groups were in 1780. In 1833, an improper rul-
ing by a nisi prius judge in England on the right to open and
close a jury case was an irregularity of practice, but not ground
for a new trial.13 Five years later such an improper ruling was
ground for a new trial14 A principle from group five was trans-
ferred to group one.
SECTION 3: WHAT ARE RULES OF COURT?*
As already indicated, lawyers use the word rule in different
senses. A rule of law is the restatement of a pre-existing prin-
12. Printed in Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 20, 300 Pac. 575, 580
(1931).
13. Burrell v. Nicholson, 1 M. & Rob. 304, 174 Eng. Rep. 104 (1833).
14. Huckman v. Fernie, 3 M. & W. 505, 150 Eng. Rep. 1245 (1838).
* See, for a list of 108 law review articles on rule-making power and
similar topics 16 A. B. A. J. 199 (1930). More recent law review articles
are here appended, arranged alphabetically according to authors. Atwood,
Missouri Rule as to the Regulation of the Bar (1936) 1 Mo. L. Rev. 227,
reprinted 14 Tenn. L. Rev. 438 (1937); Beardsley, Law Encroachments
(1930) 14 Jour. Am. Jud. Soc. 130; Beardsley, Judicial Claim to Inherent
Power over the Bar (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 509; Beardsley, Inherent and
Impliedly Granted Judicial Power Over the Bar (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 728;
Beardsley, A Reply to "The Illinois View of Judicial Power" [by Miller,
q. v.] (1934) 20 A. B. A. J. 124; Blackard, Past and Present Requisites for
Admission to the Bar in Tennessee (1936) 14 Tenn. L. Rev. 135; Chesnut,
Analysis of Proposed New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1936) 22
A. B. A. J. 533; Chused, Public Comment as Contempt of Court (1930) 16
ST. Louis LAW REvi w 24; Clark (Boyle), Missouri's Accomplishments and
Program for Eliminating the Unlawful Practice of Law (1936) 22 A. B.
A. J. 9, reprinted 14 Tenn. L. Rev. 248 (1936); Clark (Boyle), The Mis-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol22/iss4/2
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ciple of law. The originating source of the principle is indepen-
dent of the tribunal or person formulating the rule. The rule in
Shelley's case was based on a principle of law recognized and fol-
lowed long before Shelley's case was decided. Chief Justice Shaw,
discussing an important point in criminal procedure, said: "This
is the old established rule of the common law, adopted and acted
souri Plan to Bar Government (1936) 14 Tenn. L. Rev. 348; Clark(Charles), The Proposed Federal Rules of Procedure (1936) 22 A. B. A. J.
447; Rules of Civil Procedure for Federal Courts (1936) 22 A. B. A. J.
787; Dowling, Inherent Power of the Judiciary (1935) 21 A. B. A. J. 635,
reprinted 11 Ind. L. J. 116 (1935); Editorial, Who Shall Control Criminal
Procedure? (1929) 13 Jour. Am. Jud. Soc. 107; Editorial, Cannon Rein-
statement Statute Declared Unconstitutional (1932) 18 A. B. A. J. 143;
Editorial, Extraordinary Situation in Wisconsin (1931) 17 A. B. A. J. 561;
Editorial, New York Merchants Indorse Judicial Council and Rule-Making
Power (1932) 18 A. B. A. J. 76; Editorial, Power of Courts to Promulgate
Rules for Inferior Courts (1935) 69 U. S. L. Rev. 1; Editorial, Rule-Making
Authority in Missouri (1936) 19 Jour. Am. Jud. Soc. 166; Finch, Judicial
in Place of Legislative, Court Procedure (1933) 10 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev.
360; Finch, Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure for the Federal Courts(1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 809; Gambrell, Lay Encroachments on the Legal
Profession (1931) 29 Mich. L. Rev. 989; Gertner, Inherent Power of Courts
to Make Rules (1936) 10 U. of Cinn. L. Rev. 32; Hawley, Bar Integration
in Idaho (1931) 14 Jour. Am. Jud. Soc. 141; Houck, Judicial Power and
the Duty to Eliminate the Unlawful Practice of Law (1935) 21 A. B. A. J.
717; Hugus, An Integrated Bar (1936) 43 W. Va. L. Q. 10; Hyde, From
Common Law Rules to Rules of Court (1937) 22 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
LAW QuARTRLY 187; Kephart, Unauthorized Practice of Law (1936) 40
Dickinson L. Rev. 225; Miller, The Illinois View of Judicial Power-A Reply[to Beardsley, q. v.] (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 616; Miller, The Illinois View
of Judicial Power [No. 2] (1934) 20 A. B. A. J. 26; Mitchell, Proposed
New Rules of Civil Procedure in Federal Courts (1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 780;
Nelles, The Summary Power to Punish for Contempt (1931) 31 Col. L.
Rev. 956; Panter, The Inherent Power of Courts to Formulate Rules of
Practice (1935) 29 Ill. L. Rev. 911; Parker, Enforcement of Professional
Ethics (1935) 21 A. B. A. J. 514; Potts, Inadequacy of Disbarment Machin-
ery (1934) 12 Texas L. Rev. 127; Robinson, Self-Help or Self-Destruction?
The Rule-Making Power (1937) 9 Rocky Mountain L. Rev. 122; Shafroth,
The Legal Education Wilderness (1934) 9 Ind. L. J. 369; Shanfeld, TheScope of Judicial Independence in Procedure and Control of the Bar (1934)
19 ST. Louis LAW REvmEW 163; Sunderland, Progress Toward a Better Ad-
ministration of Justice (1933) 17 Jour. Am. Jud. Soc. 49; Sunderland, The
Function and Organization of a Judicial Council (1934) 9 Ind. L. J. 479;
Sunderland, Character and Extent of Rule-Making Power Granted to the
United States Supreme Court (1935) 21 A. B. A. J. 404; Tolman, Pro-
posed Rules of Civil Procedure in Federal Courts (1936) 22 A. B. A. J.
783; Turrentine, Bar Discipline (1935) 34 Mich. L. Rev. 200; Tyler, Origin
of the Rule-Making Power and Its Exercise by the Legislatures (1936) 22
A. B. A. J. 772; Weihofen, Practice of Law by Motor Clubs (1936) 3 U. of
Chi. L. Rev. 296; Wheaton, Procedural Improvements and the Rule-Making
Power of Our Courts (1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 642; Wheaton, Courts and the
Rule-Making Power (1936) 1 Mo. L. Rev. 261, reprinted 14 Tenn. L. Rev.
448 (1937) ; Wigmore, Proposed Rules of Civil Practice in Federal Courts(1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 811.
1937]
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upon in this commonwealth, by which courts of justice are bound
to be governed, until altered by the Legislature.'r1e Rules of law
are based upon statutes or judicial decisions. In the recent and
important case of Funk v. United States'( the term "rule" (or
"rules") is used thirty-six times and in each instance it indicates
a rule of law. A special rule of court is an order in the course
of a particular law suit directed by the court against one of the
litigants or an officer of the court. The term is still a common
one in proceedings for extraordinary remedies.1" A general rule
of court is an order directed against all persons who come with-
in its scope. Like a statute it acts prospectively and like a statute
it must be promulgated or published to be effective. 8 Unlike a
rule of law, which is a concise repetition of a principle already
valid, a rule of court, whether special or general, derives its au-
thority from the same court that formulates the rule.:"
An interesting and somewhat confusing use of the term in
two different technical senses can be found in Kolkman v. Peo-
ple20 by examining the so-called "Rule 14b" of the Supreme Court
of Colorado, adopted in 1929 after a legislative delegation of
power to make rules of procedure had been enacted in 1913. The
"Rule 14b" is as follows: "The rules governing comments by dis-
trict judges on evidence shall be those now in force in the United
States district courts." In the title of the rule the word rule
15. Commonwealth v. Carey, 12 Cush. (66 Mass.) 246, 252 (1853).
16. 290 U. S. 371, 54 S. Ct. 212, 78 L. ed. 369 (1933).
17. "The preliminary rule in prohibition is made absolute." State ex rel.
Madden v. Padberg, 101 S. W. (2d) 1003, 1008 (Mo. 1937).1 18. See Rules of the Supreme Court of Missouri, revised to Nov. 1, 1934,
any volume of official reports since 334 Mo., appendix pp. i-xx.
19. The term nde of judges was formerly sometimes applied to those
mysterious resolutions (from which evolved the modern advisory opinions),
adopted in conference by the justices and barons of the old common law
courts of England. A rather important resolution changing the practice,
but not the established common law of procedure, in regard to the right to
open and close jury trials in certain tort cases, is described in Carter v.
Jones, 6 Car. & P. 64, 172 Eng. Rep. 1147 (1833), s. c. 1 Mood & R. 281,
174 Eng. Rep. 96. Apparently this resolution was never reduced to writing
officially and was never formally promulgated. Its existence was not even
known to counsel for one of the litigants in the case cited. Later it became
very important and was referred to as the "rule of the judges." Best, Right
to Begin and Reply (Crandall's Amer. ed. 1886) 113-126. This so-called rule
has attracted some attention in this country. Judge v. Stone, 44 N. H. 593,
606 (1863) (not recognized as binding); 1 Monell, Practice, N. Y. (2d ed.
1853) 647 (referred to as a "a mere arbitrary regulation").
20. 89 Colo. 8, 20, 300 Pac. 575, 580 (1931). For a judicious note see
27 Ill. L. Rev. 664 (1933).
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means a command formulated and made effective by the supreme
court of Colorado, because the court itself is undoubtedly clothed
with authority to make, repeal and amend rules of procedure.
The so-called "rules now in force in the United States district
courts" are merely principles of the common law which the
United States district judges, by virtue of the doctrine of stare
decisis, have no power to modify. As will be emphasized in Sec-
tion 7 of this article, at the time of the American Revolution in
England and also in this country, general rules of court were
always invalid if in conflict with established rules of the common
law of procedure or with statutes.
In the first half of the nineteenth century in England, a proce-
dural rule-making power was conferred upon courts by legisla-
tion with the intention of lodging in the courts a power to pro-
mulgate rules of higher authority than earlier statutes so that in
case of conflict the rules would supersede the statutes. (It should
be noted that this kind of rule-making power is conferred by the
legislature; the rule-making power described in Section 5 is not
conferred but is inherent, that is, implied by the Constitution.)
In 1833, the British Parliament passed the epoch-making Civil
Procedure Act,2' which, in addition to prescribing immediate
alterations in the common law of procedure, conferred some rule-
making power upon the courts and expressly indicated that in
case of conflict between new rules and old statutes and old rules
of common law, the new rules would prevail. By authority of
this statute the common law courts promulgated the famous
Hilary Rules.2 2 Since 1873 in England, and since 1913 in this
country, the procedural rule-making power of courts has been
greatly extended by legislation. Every American lawyer is now
familiar with the existence in the Anglo-American system of a
judicial procedural rule-making power which for practical pur-
poses is a legislative power as well as a judicial power.
In this article, as a matter of convenience, those procedural
rules of court which are of higher authority than conflicting stat-
utes will be called superstatutory rules of court. Those proce-
dural rules of court, conforming to the original normal type,
21. 3 and 4 Win. IV, c. 42.
22. Adequately described for Americans in McKyring v. Bull, 16 N. Y.
297, 69 Am. Dec. 696 (1857).
19371
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which are effective only when not in conflict with statutes, will
be called substatutory rules of court.
For constitutional reasons it sometimes happens in this coun-
try that a rule of court will be superstatutory even if the legis-
lature has not conferred rule-making power on the court and has
deliberately designed to contravene or to prevent a particular
rule of court. Examples of this kind of superstatutory rules of
court will be given in Section 8 of this article.
England, 3 the United States, 24 and ten states" have provided
for the existence of superstatutory rules of procedure.
In the absence of a statutory or direct constitutional grant of
authority, has an appellate court power to prescribe substatu-
tory rules of practice for the trial courts? On principle the
answer would be a negative one, because in this country the
typical trial court is a separate constitutional tribunal, subject
only to a reviewing jurisdiction and a superintending control. 2
In seventeen states the question is superfluous because by
either constitutional provision or legislative enactment the high-
est appellate courts (or a judicial council, or a conference of
judges) have been given power to promulgate substatutory rules
23. 15 and 16 George V, c. 99.
24. 48 Stat. 926, 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 723-a (1934), applies to criminal pro-
cedure. 48 Stat. 1064, 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 723-b (1934), applies to civil pro-
cedure at law. 48 Stat. 1064, 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 723-c (1934) makes possible
union of law and equity, subject to veto by congress.
25. Alabama, Gen. Acts, 1935, 177 (applies to equity cases only);
Colorado, Code Civ. Proc. Comp. Laws, 1921, sec. 444, p. 184; Delaware,
Rev. Code, 1935, 108, sec. 6; Florida, Comp. Stats., 1936 Supp., sec. 4682 (1);
Maryland, Const. 1867, Art. 4, sec. 18 (applies only to equity pleading and
practice; may be changed by the General Assembly, similar power in com-
mon law granted by General Assembly in 1927; Code of 1924, 1935 Supp.,
Art. 26, sec. 35); New Jersey, 2 Cum. Supp. to C. S., sec. 163-308, P.
2820 (power in supreme court to prescribe rules at common law); Laws
of N. J., 1915, c. 116, sec. 11, p. 168; Comp. St. Supp. 1924, sec. 33-124
(the chancellor makes procedural changes in equity); New Mexico, Laws,
1933, c. 84, p. 147; Washington, Rem. 1927 Supp., secs. 13-1 and 13-2; West
Virginia, Acts of W. Va., 1935, c. 37, p. 169 (official notice required, and
hearing if requested); Wisconsin, Wisc. Stat. 1935, sec. 251, p. 18 (official
notice required, and hearing if requested).
26. Smith v. Valentine, 19 Minn. 452 (1878); Trotter v. Heckscher, 41
N. J. Eq. 478, 4 Atl. 784 (1886). "The right of the circuit court to make
its own rules is a right that is inherent"--but the supreme court has the
right to review on writ of error. Risher v. Thomas, 2 Mo. 98 (1828).
Contra, People v. Callopy, 358 Ill. 11, 192 N. E. 634 (1934). The court also
held that the action of the trial court in violation of the Supreme Court's
rule was a violation of the common law of Illinois, and this weakens the
authority of the case so far as rule-making power is concerned.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol22/iss4/2
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of court so as to bring about uniformity in the domain of pro-
cedure not controlled by statutes.2 7
Making certain adjustments, 3 it seems that twenty-five state
supreme courts (or judicial councils or similar committees) have
the power to bring about complete uniformity of practice in the
trial courts of their respective states.
In England, before judicial rule-making power was exalted by
Parliament into a quasi-legislative function, there was the same
important difference between statutes and general rules of court
that existed in all American states down to 1913, and still exists
in thirty-eight states. In Bartholomew v. Carter 2 9 it appears that
under an act of Parliament a defendant had a right to rely on
a statutory defense after pleading the general issue without any
special plea. A subsequent rule of court required in every such
case that the defendant should write in the margin of his plea
the words "by statute." In the case cited, the defendant insisted
that the rule of court was in conflict with the statute, and there-
fore void. All lawyers in the case, at the bar and on the bench,
agreed that if there was a conflict, the rule would fail. The court
decided that the rule did not relate to pleading, but was a mere
regulation of practice, like designating a certain office in which
pleadings should be filed, and therefore the rule was held to be
binding because not in conflict with the statute.
27. Alabama, Code of 1928, sec. 6663 (rules for all courts not contrary
to provisions of Code) ; General Acts, 1935, 177, (superstatutory rules may
be adopted by the Supreme Court for equity cases); Arizona, R. C. 1928,
sec. 3652; California, Const., 1879, Art. VI, sec. 1-a amended in 1926 (power
lodged in a judicial council); Illinois, Smith-Hurd Ill. Stat. 1935, c. 110,
see. 126; Callaghan's Ill. Stat. Ann. 1933 Supp., c. 110, sec. 130; Kansas,
R. S. Kan. 1935, sec. 60-3825; Michigan, Const. 1908, Art. VII, sec. 5;
Mississippi, Code 1930, Vol. 1, sec. 3377; Nebraska, Const. 1875, Art. 5,
see. 25, amended 1920; New York, Cahill's Consol. Laws 1930, c. 31, sec.
82 (majority of App. Div. judges make rules of trial courts); North
Dakota, 1913-25 Supp. to Comp. Laws, sec. 769a6, p. 326; Ohio, Page's
Ann. Gen. Code, 1932, secs. 10501-13 (rules for probate court only) ; Okla-
homa, 1 Okl. Stat. 1931, c. 1, Art. 1, sec. 23; Rhode Island, Gen. Laws 1923,
see. 4651, p. 1365 (rules of the superior court are subject to approval of
the supreme court); South Dakota, Comp. Laws 1929, Vol. 1, sec. 2504-A;
Tennessee, Code of 1932, Art. V, sec. 9928, p. 2102 (rules must be promul-
gated by unanimous vote of supreme judges); Texas, Const., 1876, Art. V,
see. 25, amended 1891; Virginia, Code, 1930, secs. 5960-5960a.
28. Alabama: supra, notes 25 and 27. Ohio: rule-making power for
Probate Courts only. Supra, note 27.
29. 3 Man. & G. 125, 133 Eng. Rep. 1083 (1841).
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SECTION 4: THE DIFFERENT FUNCTIONS OF THE JUDICIARY
UNDER A TYPICAL AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTION.
The man who was most influential in developing American
constitutional law was not John Marshall or James Madison, but
a Frenchman named Charles-Louis Montesquieu. Nearly 200
years ago Montesquieu, influenced by John Locke, advanced the
suggestion that all governmental authority manifests itself in
the three domains of legislative, executive and judicial power,
which should be kept rigidly separate. 0 This doctrine of the
separation of powers as advanced by Montesquieu was received
in America with almost religious enthusiasm and has now been
frozen into our American constitutional law, both federal and
state.
We Americans all agree that in the main the results have
been desirable, and we all agree that the doctrine has caused
some confusion and vexatious litigation. Much of this confusion
has to do with questionable exercises of alleged legislative power
or judicial power.3 1
The undoubted field of legislative power has to do with modify-
ing substantive law. The undoubted field of judicial power has
to do with deciding law-suits by applying substantive law. Be-
tween these two fields of undoubted constitutional power there
is a border-land, like a wilderness, through which the theoretical
boundary line runs without being definitely marked. "There are
certain powers inherent in the judicial office. How far the legis-
lative department of the government can impair them, or dictate
the manner of their exercise, are interesting questions; but it is
unnecessary in this case to consider them. 38 2 These words were
used by the Supreme Court of the United States when deciding
that the so-called Conformity Act of June 1, 1872, 33 does not re-
30. For modern criticisms, see Frankfurter and Landis, Power of Con-
gress to Regulate Contempts-A Study in Separation of Powers (1924) 37
Harv. L. Rev. 1010; MacCorkle, The Separation of Powers (1937) 14 Tenn.
L. Rev. 390.
31. In Oklahoma, during the present decade, confusion existed in the
borderland between the executive and the judiciary, resulting in drastic
action by the judiciary. See 18 Jour. Am. Jud. Soc., 8-15, 119-123 (1934).
And of course in the new-deal litigation the confusion was between the
legislative and executive branches.
32. Nudd v. Burrows, 21 U. S. 426, 441, 23 L. ed. 286, 290 (1875).
33. 17 Stat. 196, 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 724 (1872). The point decided had
to do with statutory construction, not legislative power. The case is direct
authority for the assertion that the "personal conduct and administration
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quire federal judges to abandon the common law as to giving
instructions to the jury even if a local state statute has modified
the common law so far as the state courts are concerned.
The first function of the legislative department of a typical
state government is to change, when needed, substantive laws
affecting public and private rights, including laws to provide
revenue and for the orderly conduct of governmental business.
The first and chief function of the judicial department of govern-
ment is to administer justice, that is, to determine and prevent
controversies by applying substantive law through court proceed-
ings. For the fair, orderly, and convenient administration of
justice, it is necessary to have certain rules regulating pleading
and practice (process, preliminaries other than pleading, trial,
judgment, execution) in the courts of justice. The second func-
tion of the judicial department is to administer fairly and intelli-
gently these rules of procedure because substantive rights depend
upon such administration of procedural rules. On theoretical
grounds it can be insisted that the creation, modification and re-
peal of such rules of procedure is inherently a judicial function,
and then the duty of prescribing rules of procedure would be a
part of the second function of the judicial department of govern-
ment. On theoretical grounds it can be urged that, since these
of the judge in discharge of his separate functions is... neither practice,
pleading, nor a form or mode of proceeding within the meaning of those
terms as found in" the Conformity Act. 21 U. S. 426, 441, 23 L. ed. 286,
290 (1875). The case, in common with many state court decisions, is highly
persuasive authority for the assertion that in a typical American state the
legislature by statute can abolish the common law privilege of the trialjudge to comment orally upon the evidence in a law-suit where a jury is
trying the facts. The constitutionality of such statutes has been questioned.
Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure (1918) 31 Harv.
L. Rev. 669, 680-681. It should be remembered that the principle of no-
comment in some states has been established not by statute or constitutional
provision, but by judicial decisions modifying the old common law as unfit
for the local environment. Whitelaw's Exec. v. Whitelaw, 83 Va. 40, 1 S. E.
407 (1887); State v. Thompson, 21 W. Va. 741, 756 (1882). Very likely
in many states the no-comment statutes, when adopted, were merely codi-
fications of the local common law. This must be true of Illinois. The no-
comment statute was not adopted until 1845, and yet the Virginia type of
common law prevailed from the beginning. People v. Callopy, 358 Ill. 11,
192 N. E. 634 (1934). There is a problem of history here not yet suffi-
ciently studied, namely, the influence of American trial judges and Ameri-
can legal advisers in modifying the English common law in this country.
Allied to it is another problem of history, namely, the extent to which
American statutes in derogation of English common law are in reality codi-
fications of local state common law. For examples in Pennsylvania, see
Wharton, Commentaries on Law (1884) sec. 23.
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rules of court procedure have to do with the orderly conduct of
the state government, the duty of providing such rules is pri-
marily a legislative function. For the present this conflict be-
tween two theories of governmental power in creating new rules
of procedure will be put to one side.34
Attention is now directed to a third judicial function which
has to do with certain matters ancillary to the administration of
justice, intimately connected with, but not directly a part of, the
administration of justice by courts. One of these ancillary mat-
ters has to do with the admission of qualified persons to the privi-
leges and responsibilities of the public profession of the law.3
Another ancillary matter has to do with preventing unqualified
or unauthorized persons from practicing law. Another has to
do with punishing contempts of court affecting the administra-
tion of justice, whether committed by lawyers or laymen. And
there are other matters ancillary to the administration of justice
but not directly a part of it, such as permitting the use of photo-
graphic cameras or radio-broadcasting sets in the court room.
Probably in every civilized society, certainly in the United
States, the actual business of conducting law-suits according to
established legal principles of right and wrong is intended, not
only to settle existing disputes, but also to be a guide for human
conduct so that thereafter many controversies can be avoided or
determined without litigation. Probably in every civilized coun-
try, certainly in the United States, this delegated and vicarious
duty of administering justice according to the conventional prin-
ciples of right and wrong laid down in the courts is carried on
by men and women of specialized training, who are known as
lawyers. In the United States these lawyers are regarded as
officers of the court, and, in addition to being qualified to con-
duct litigation in court, they are also qualified and authorized
to give advice to their clients outside of court and sometimes in
association with lawyers retained by adversaries of their own
clients, to make proper adjustments, compromises and settle-
ments in civil matters, and thus perform one of the first duties
34. To be noticed again in Section 9.
35. "The public profession of the law"-that pregnant phrase was intro-
duced into American jurisprudence by Alfred Z. Reed, since 1913 adviser
on legal education to the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of
Teaching. See Reed, Training for the Public Profession of the Law (1921)
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, Bull. No. 15.
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of a lawyer, namely, to serve as a peace-maker for society. Out-
side the court house a lawyer is often socially useful in settling
disputes in the capacity of arbitrator or umpire for business men,
or members of one family, with conflicting interests, who may
or may not be represented before him by adversary attorneys.2 6
If a lawyer, after being licensed to practice law, so conducts him-
self as to thwart the administration of justice, either by mis-
conduct in the court or by misconduct outside of court, he should
be subject to discipline. If a person who is not a lawyer under-
takes to act as a lawyer and enjoy the privileges of practicing
law, he has offended against the administration of justice.
Is the duty of protecting society from evils following the ille-
gal practice of law, or the practice of law by unqualified persons,
a judicial duty or a legislative duty, or a duty shared concur-
rently by both the judiciary and the legislature? Different an-
swers have been offered to this question. In the next section
an effort will be made to present the answer which is the most
reasonable and best supported by authority.37
SECTION 5: THE DOCTRINE OF INHERENT JUDICIAL POWER
OVER MATTERS ANCILLARY TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, BUT CONCURRENT WITH NON-FRUSTRATING
LEGISLATIVE POWER.
In connection with the regulatory power of courts the word
inherent is used by lawyers in three senses. In the first sense,
the only sense in which the word is ever used by English lawyers,
inherent means implied and completely effective, unless and until
a statute supervenes and destroys the implied power. Quite fre-
36. An amusing and instructive illustration of this particular function
of an English barrister is given in G. Bernard Shaw's play, You Never Can
Tell (1898).
37. The difference between the three kinds, or three manifestations, of
judicial power, are recognized by Ellison, C. J., in his masterly opinion for
the majority in Clark v. Austin, 101 S. W. (2d) 977, 988-9 (Mo. 1937).
In this Section 4 of the present article, the effort has been merely to repeat
and expound what was judicially announced in the case last mentioned.
Many questions remain unsettled. In the Austin case the offending laymen
violated a statute prohibiting them as laymen from practicing law in any
tribunal, statutory as well as constitutional. Suppose the statute should be
amended so as to permit certified accountants to practice law in all tribu-
nals. What would the Supreme Court do with the statute? There are
passages in the majority opinion in the Austin case suggesting that the
new legislation might be valid as to statutory tribunals, such as the Public
Service Commission, essentially non-judicial, and invalid as to constitutional
courts possessing regular common-law-and-equity jurisdiction.
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quently (and very properly) the word is used in this way by
American lawyers 8 In the second sense, inherent, as applied
to a regulatory power of constitutional courts, indicates a power
implied by the constitution in such an undoubted and essential
fashion that even the legislature cannot by express enactment
take the power away from the courts. The power is immune
from destruction or frustration by the legislature. 9 In the third
sense the word inherent means something sinister and indicates
superconstitutional power belonging to courts because they are
courts, and not because they are American constitutional courts.40
In this article the word inherent is used, except in quotations,
only in the second sense. An inherent judicial power is a power
granted impliedly by the people through the constitution and
therefore not to be taken away, crippled or frustrated by the
legislature.
There is an inherent judicial power to regulate non-procedural
matters ancillary to the administration of justice, which power
is concurrent with legislative power so long as the legislative
power is not exercised to frustrate the administration of justice.
If the legislative power is exercised so as to destroy, cripple or
frustrate the administration of justice, then the judicial power
becomes exclusive and the frustrating legislation is unconstitu-
tional.
The doctrine presented in this section is a synthesis and blend-
ing of four principles of American constitutional law. These four
principles will now be indicated and then each one will be men-
tioned again with reference to authorities. The four principles
are these: (1) The constitutional requirement of a three-fold
division of government should be liberally and not strictly con-
strued. (2) Apart from deciding law-suits and apart from all
38. So used as applying to statutory, not constitutional, courts in Nudd v.
Burrows, 21 U. S. 426, 441, 23 L. ed. 286, 290 (1875).
39. "In the courts erected by the Constitution there is an inherent power
of self-defense and self-preservation." Carter v. Commonwealth, 96 Va.
791, 816, 32 S. E. 780, 785, 45 L. R. A. 310, 315 (1899).
40. For an example of this use of the word, see majority opinion in
State v. Cannon, 196 Wis. 534, 539, 221 N. W. 603, 604 (1928). And for a
protest against any judicial power being superior to constitutions, see dis-
senting opinion in the same case, 1. c. 541 and 605. See also Nelles and King,
Contempt by Publication (1928) 28 Col. L. Rev. 401, 425-a mine of infor-
mation on constitutional provisions, statutes and cases relating to contempt
of court.
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responsibility for procedure, the judiciary has inherent power
over matters affecting the administration of justice. (3) The
matters just referred to may be helpfully regulated through stat-
utory enactments. (4) If such statutory enactments frustrate
the administration of justice, they will be declared unconstitu-
tional by the courts.
The constitutional requirement of a three-fold division of gov-
ernment should be liberally and not strictly construed. The draft-
ers of the New Hampshire Constitution of 1792, aware of danger
in logic when divorced from experience, restated Montesquieu's
dogma as follows: "In the government of this State, the three
essential powers thereof, to-wit, the legislative, executive and
judicial, ought to be kept as separate from, and independent of,
each other as the nature of a free government will admit, or as
is consistent with that chain of connection that binds the whole
fabric of the Constitution in one indissoluble bond of union and
amity."4 1
Practically the same result has been reached in the other states
and in the federal government through judicial exposition. Judge
James B. Gantt in Rhodes v. Bell" expressed the prevailing
American view when he said that although it was "the purpose
of the people in the framing and adoption of our constitutional
provision to keep the several departments of our state govern-
ment separate and independent in the spheres allotted to each,
a careful study of the whole constitution will, we think, demon-
strate that it was not the purpose to make a total separation of
these three powers." 43
Apart from deciding law-suits and apart from all responsibil-
ity for procedure, the judiciary has inherent power over matters
affecting the administration of justice. Admission to the bar of
a particular state so as to enable the lawyer thus admitted to
practice law, as attorney or as counsellor, is a matter which is
41. Part I, Art. 137; same in Const. of 1902.
42. 230 Mo. 138, 150, 130 S. W. 465, 468 (1910).
43. To the same effect: People ex rel. Rusch v. White, 334 Ill. 465, 479,
166 N. E. 100, 105, 64 A. L. R. 1006, 1014 (1929); State ex rel. Patterson
v. Bates, 96 Minn. 110, 115, 104 N. W. 709, 711, 113 Am. St. Rep. 612, 617
(1905); Clark v. Austin, 101 S. W. (2d) 977, 987 (Mo. 1937); Saratoga
Springs v. Saratoga Gas, E. L. & P. Co., 191 N. Y. 123, 132, 83 N. E. 693,
695, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 713, 718, 14 Ann. Cas. 606, 607 (1908); 1 Story,
Constitution (5th ed., 1891) sec. 525; 3 Willoughby, Constitutional Law
(2d ed., 1929) sees. 1062-1066.
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non-procedural and ancillary to administering justice, and is
subject to control by the judiciary through the exercise of inher-
ent judicial power. ByrdonjaAk v. State Bar" and In re Day"
are two important cases which support the statement just made.
Other cases are cited in the footnote below.46 The United States
Supreme Court at its beginning refused to admit attorneys to
practice at its bar merely because they were members of their
local state bars, and this caused some resentment, but was ac-
quiesced in.
7
The disbarment of attorneys and the determination of grounds
for disbarment are likewise matters over which the judiciary
has inherent power. In the illuminating case of In Re Richards,4"
the court said: "It is not always easy to determine what objects
are naturally within the range or orbit of a particular depart-
ment of government, but it will scarcely be denied that a pri-
mary object essentially within the orbit of the judicial depart-
ment is that courts function in the administration of justice, for
which purpose they were created, and in the light of judicial his-
tory they cannot long continue to do this without power to admit
and disbar attorneys who from time immemorial have in a pecu-
liar sense been their officers. 14 9
The prevention and discouragement of practicing law by per-
sons and corporations unauthorized to do so constitute another
matter ancillary to administering justice.10 The same is true of
contempt of court directly affecting the orderly administration
of justice, whether on the part of lawyers or laymen.';
44. 208 Cal. 439, 281 Pac. 1018, 66 A. L. R. 1507 (1929).
45. 181 Ill. 73, 54 N. E. 646, 50 L. R. A. 519 (1899).
46. Opinions of the Justices, 279 Mass. 607, 180 N. E. 725, 81 A. L. R.
1059 (1932); In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 240 N. W. 441 (1932); Ex parte
Steckler, 179 La. 410, 154 So. 41 (1934).
47. Rule II, adopted Feb. 5, 1790, 1 Cranch xvii, 2 L. ed. 13. See 1
Warren, Supreme Court in U. S. History (1922) 54.
48. 333 Mo. 907, 915, 63 S. W. (2d) 672, 675 (1933).
49. See also In re Myrland, 45 Ariz. 484, 45 P. (2d) 9§3 (1935) ; Gould v.
State, 99 Fla. 622, 127 So. 309, 69 A. L. R. 699 (1930); People ex rel.
Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N. Y. 465, 162 N. E. 487 (1928) ; Danforth v. Egan,
23 S.. D. 43, 119 N. W. 1021, 20 Ann. Cas. 418, 139 Am. St. Rep. 1030
(1909).
50. Berk v. State ex rel. Thompson, 225 Ala. 424, 142 So. 832, 84 A. L. R.
740 (1932); State ex rel. Miller v. St. Louis Trust Co., 335 Mo. 845, 74
S. W. (2d) 343 (1934); State ex rel. McKittrick v. C. S. Dudley and Co.,
Inc., 102 S. W. (2d) 895 (Mo. 1937).
51. Bradley v. State, 111 Ga. 168, 36 S. E. 630, 50 L. R. A. 691 (1900);
Clark v. Austin, 101 S. W. (2d) 977 (Mo. 1937); Rhode Island Bar Ass'n
v. Auto Service Ass'n, 56 R. 1. 122, 179 At. 139, 100 A. L. R. 226 (1935).
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The matters just referred to may be helpfully regulated
through statutory enactments. Most of the cases cited in the
paragraphs immediately preceding as authorities for an inherent
judicial power to regulate certain matters ancillary to the ad-
ministration of justice were cases in which the legislative power
was also exercised without any question being raised by the
courts (if we disregard a few dissenting opinions) as to the
validity of such exercise of legislative power. In each of these
cases it was found or assumed that the legislative enactments
were in the interest of the state itself and not harmful to the
administration of justice. Other examples of legislation helpful
to the judiciary in a field where the judiciary claims inherent
power are cited in the footnote below.52
If such statutory enactments frustrate the administration of
justice, they will be declared unconstitutional by the courts. The
acceptance of the doctrine restated in this section does not
weaken the judiciary. The doctrine of judicial review is part
and parcel of American law. The courts are created to protect
all constitutional rights, including their own rights. If a par-
ticular statute or part of a statute is found to frustrate the
administration of justice, it will be ignored as an unconstitu-
tional intrusion upon the judicial domain. The limits of the leg-
islative power are clearly set forth by Chief Justice Ellison in
Clark v. Austin.53 Speaking for the majority of the court, he
says:
"The ultimate objective of both departments may be the
same-the good of the people in the administration of jus-
tice; but the powers are fundamentally different. The courts'
power essentially is protective and self-serving; the legis-
lative power is to advance the public welfare. And it will not
do to say the Legislature can attain this end merely by pass-
ing punitive statutes. If it has the power to prescribe pun-
ishments for acts committed in the practice of law, it also
has the power to define the acts for which those punish-
ments are to be assessed, and to prohibit such acts without
assessing any punishment, leaving it to the courts to dis-
52. In re Shattuck, 208 Cal. 6, 279 Pac. 998 (1929) (state bar act valid);
In re Edwards, 45 Idaho 676, 266 Pac. 665 (1928) (state bar act valid in
part and invalid in part); In re Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 Pac. 291 (1930)
(state bar act valid); In re Morse, 98 Vt. 85, 126 Atl. 550, 36 A. L. R.
527 (1924) (illegal practice of law act applied to layman).
53. 101 S. W. (2d) 977, 997 (Mo. 1937).
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cipline the offenders as their officers. On the other hand,
the Legislature could, by passing a punitive statute affect-
ing the practice of law, hamper and frustrate the courts; as
if the General Assembly in this state should make it a pun-
ishable offense for a lawyer appointed by us to serve on a
bar committee established by our Rule 36."' '
Many cases cited above illustrate the existence of this judicial
power in the absence of any manifestation of legislative power
in the same field. In other cases there was a manifestation of
legislative power. But in no case is it admitted, according to the
doctrine here set forth, that the power is delegated to the court
by the legislature, when the court is created by the constitution
itself. The power is inherent, implied, essential, protective, be-
cause of the exalted trust placed by the people themselves in the
courts through their constitutional creation.
If the courts have an inherent power to regulate non-proce-
dural matters ancillary to administering justice, then the courts
have a power to promulgate rules which would be superstatutory
in case of a conflict with legislative enactments. Such rules in
the matter of admission to the bar have become quite common
during the past decade. Canons of ethics have also been pre-
scribed as rules of court.
A comparison of an unrepealed statute of Missouri" setting
.forth rather low minimum educational requirements for appli-
cants for admission to the bar with a certain rule of the Supreme
Court,56 effective since November 1, 1934, will indicate that in
Missouri the inherent power of the judiciary to admit attorneys
and to control their educational preparation is an accepted fact.
A futuristic rule of court was promulgated. It has been enforced.
It is more drastic than the earlier statute. Insofar as there is a
conflict, the rule is superstatutory 7
Among the rules promulgated by the Missouri Supreme Court
in 1934 was Rule 3558 which set forth, as binding on all attor-
54. See Appendix to any volume of official reports since 334 Mo., page
xvii.
55. R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 11696.
56. Rule 38, printed in each volume of official Missouri Reports since
.334 Mo., appendix, page xviii.
57. See also in re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54 N. E. 646, 50 L. R. A. 19 (1899)
(rules prevail over statute); Ex parte Steclder, 179 La. 410, 154 So. 41(1934) (rule followed although more drastic than statute) ; In re Cannon,
206 Wis. 374, 240 N. W. 441 (1932) (statute ignored).
58. See any volume of official Missouri Reports since 334 Mo., appendix,
:pp. vii-xv.
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neys, the Code of Ethics of the American Bar Association, each
canon being numbered as a separate section of the rule. Canon
34 of the Code, original section 34 of Missouri Rule 35,59 seems
to permit a splitting of collection fees with a layman "where
it is not prohibited by statute." Such practice is clearly prohib-
ited and made criminal by a Missouri statute. 0 In a recent case,
State ex rel. McKittrick v. Dudley & Co., Ino.,63 the facts showed
an habitual practice of splitting fees by lawyers with a layman.
The respondent contended that this rule of court,62 insofar as it
adopted the language of the Code of Ethics, impliedly permitted
the splitting of fees because the rule had modified the earlier
statute. The court en banc, speaking through Judge Tipton,
properly held that the rule by any reasonable construction was
not in conflict with the statute, but to avoid confusion in the fu-
ture the court on March 26, 1937, amended the rule by a formal
order so that now the Missouri rule is more drastic than canon
34 of the Code of Ethics 6 3
The assumption of rule-making power in 1934 by the Missouri
Supreme Court in the matter of legal education, bar-admission,
bar-discipline and bar-protection, very naturally has attracted
attention. Helpful expositions of the new situation have been
published by Judge Atwood 64 and by General Chairman Clark.65
In Section 7 of this article an effort is made to show that in
the field of procedure, insofar as procedure concerns controver-
sies at common law (both civil and criminal) and in equity, and
also under statutes creating new rights, the legislature is su-
preme and procedural statutes are binding on the courts, sub-
ject to ordinary constitutional limitations. How about remedial
59. Ibid.
60. R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 11694.
61. 102 S. W. (2d) 895 (Mo. 1937) (original quo warranto in Supreme
Court).
62. Rule 35, see. 34, supra, note 58.
63. 9 Mo. Bar J. 56 (1937).
64. Former judge of the Missouri Supreme Court, writer of the court's
opinion in the land-mark case of In re Richards, 333 Mo. 907, 63 S. W. (2d)
672 (1933). See his essay, The Missouri Rule as to Regulation of the Bar
(1936) 1 Mo. L. Rev. 237, reprinted 14 Tenn. L. Rev. 438 (1937).
65. Member of the Supreme Court's Bar Committees, whose ability and
persistence are largely responsible for the improved professional standing
of the Missouri Bar. See his addresses, Missouri's Accomplishments and
Program for Eliminating the Unlawful Practice of Law (1936) 22 A. B.
A. J. 9, and The Missouri Plan of Bar Government (1936) 14 Tenn. L.
Rev. 348.
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matters in connection with the judicial investigation of alleged
offences against the administration of justice, over which con-
stitutional courts have an inherent power of control, and particu-
larly violations of general rules of court designed to protect the
administration of justice? Some cases assume or assert that the
legislature is supreme in this field.65a There is another view and
on principle a sounder view. If what may be called the substan-
tive law of bar-admission and bar-exclusion and contempt of
court in the nature of contempt against the administration of
justice, is a matter over which the judicial department has an
inherent power of control (even if there is a concurrent power
in the legislative department) it would seem to follow that the
remedial details of conducting the occasional investigations nec-
essary to apply and vindicate the substantive law of such matters
would also be within the judicial department inherently, derived
from the constitution directly, and not by way of grant from
the legislative department. This is the view advanced by the
Supreme Court of Virginia in the important case of Carter v.
Commonwealth,66 wherein it was decided that a statute requir-
ing a jury trial in a contempt case directly affecting the admin-
istration of justice was unconstitutional. The court said:
"That in the courts created by the Constitution there is
an inherent power of self-defense and self-preservation;
that this power may be regulated, but cannot be destroyed,
or so far diminished as to be rendered ineffectual, by legis-
lative enactment; that it is a power necessarily resident in,
and to be exercised by the court itself, and that the vice of
an act which seeks to deprive the court of this inherent
power is not cured by providing for its exercise by a jury;
that while the legislature has the power to regulate the ju-
risdiction of circuit, county, and corporation courts, it cannot
destroy, while it may confine within reasonable bounds, the
authority necessary to the exercise of the jurisdiction con-
ferred."67
65a. Cole v. Egan, 52 Conn. 219 (1884); Ex parte Edwards, 11 Fla. 174
(1867) ; In re Darrow, 175 Ind. 44, 92 N. E. 369 (1910) ; Foster v. Common-
wealth, 8 Watts & Serg. 77 (Pa. 1844); In re Waugh, 32 Wash. 50, 72
Pac. 710 (1903).
66. 96 Va. 791, 32 S. E. 780, 45 L. R. A. 310 (1899). See Potts, Inade-
quacy of Disbarment Machinery (1934) 12 Texas L. Rev. 127.
67. 96 Va. 791, 816, 32 S. E. 780, 785, 45 L. R. A. 310, 315 (1899). To
the same effect: Hale v. State, 55 Ohio St. 210, 45 N. E. 199, 36 L. R. A.
254, 60 Am. St. Rep. 691 (1896); Lenihan v. Commonwealth, 165 Ky. 93,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol22/iss4/2
AUTHORITY FOR RULES OF COURT
Some light may be thrown on this particular problem by con-
sidering an accepted principle of American constitutional law.
If a state constitution contains a self-executing provision in the
nature of a grant of a new right, which did not exist at common
law or in equity, then the legislature cannot impair that constitu-
tional right by limiting unreasonably the remedial methods for
vindicating the constitutional right. In a Missouri case68 it ap-
peared that a new constitution had created a new property right
in connection with condemnation suits. The legislature, by a
highly restrictive procedural statute, frustrated the intention
manifested in the constitution. The Supreme Court held the stat-
ute invalid and approved the ruling of the lower court that a
remedy could be used different from the prescribed, restrictive
and allegedly exclusive remedy of the statute. And so if it is true
that bar-admission, bar-exclusion and bar-protection are matters
inherently within the control of the judiciary, and if it is true
that the legislature has passed frustrating statutes in the guise
of exclusive procedural remedies, it would follow that the pro-
cedural statutes should be disregarded. On the other hand, if the
legislature has prescribed appropriate statutory remedies to aid
the judiciary in exercising its inherent power and duty to protect
the administration of justice, then the statutes would be regarded
as non-frustrating, and appropriately would be followed. If
there is no statute, common-law precedents could be followed.
If there are frustrating statutes, they would be ignored as un-
constitutional. (It is to be noted that procedure in Sections 7, 8
and 9 of this article relates to ordinary law-suits, civil and crimi-
nal. Here in Section 5, procedural remedies referred to relate
only to judicial efforts to correct alleged interferences with the
administration of justice as protected by the judiciary.)
What has just been said seems to be illustrated by the official
attitude of the Supreme Court of Missouri during recent years.
In combating the illegal or reprehensible practice of law, that
court has exercised original jurisdiction against corporations by
using the adequate statutory remedy of quo warranto;9 against
176 S. W. 948, L. R. A. 1917B, 1132 (1915); Ex parte Cashin, 128 Miss.
224, 90 So. 850 (1922) ; State Law Examiners v. Phelan, 43 Wyo. 481, 5 P.(2d) 263, 78 A. L. R. 1317 (1931).
68. Hickman v. City of Kansas, 120 Mo. 110, 25 S. W. 225, 23 L. R. A.
658, 41 Am. St. Rep. 684 (1894).
69. State ex rel. Miller v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 335 Mo. 845, 74
S. W. (2d) 348 (1934).
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members of the Bar, by using the excellent statutory special pro-
ceeding, which now expressly names the Supreme Court as hav-
ing original jurisdiction, supplemented by a more comprehensive
rule of the Supreme Court ;7O against unlicensed laymen by using
the common-law order to show cause on information as in a con-
tempt proceeding.71 There is nothing in the Constitution express-
ly authorizing original contempt proceedings in the Supreme
Court. The subject may be regarded as covered by the short
statutory provision for notice72 or by Supreme Court Rule 36,13
effective since November 1, 1934, which expressly authorizes
certain official representatives of the Bar to prosecute "such
actions as may be appropriate to suppress such unlawful prac-
tices." The court, anticipating a highly improbable situation, in
the Austin case 4 indicated that it would disregard a statute, if
one should be passed, making it a crime for a lawyer "to serve
on a bar committee established by our Rule 36."
SECTION 6: CERTAIN DOCTRINES AT VARIANCE WITH THE
DOCTRINE PRESENTED IN SECTION 5.
In view of the possibilities of serious conflict between the ju-
dicial and legislative branches of American state governments, it
is quite remarkable, and creditable to the common-sense of legis-
lators and judges, that there have been comparatively few cases
in court which present any clash between judicial power and
legislative power in dramatic or sensational form. It is believed
that the doctrine restated in Section 5 gives the correct solution
of a constitutional problem. However, other solutions have been
advanced or assumed in the course of litigation. These other
solutions will now be indicated briefly.
The doctrine of inherent and exclusive judicial power. A doc-
trine has been advanced in this country that in matters ancillary
to the administration of justice and not connected with ordinary
questions of procedure, the courts have an inherent and exclusive
power of control, derived directly from the constitution in the
same way that the inherent and exclusive power to decide a law-
70. R. S. Mo. 1929, secs. 11708-11715; Rule 36 of the Supreme Court, 337
Mo. appendix xv.
71. Clark v. Austin, 101 S. W. (2d) 977 (Mo. 1937).
72. R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 1866.
73. 337 Mo. appendix xv.
74. 101 S. W. (2d) 977, 994 (Mo. 1937).
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suit is derived directly from the constitution. As a result of
this doctrine it would follow that any attempt by the legislature
to pass statutes relating to these matters would be unconstitu-
tional as a trespass upon the judicial field.
For the most part the doctrine is based upon dissenting opin-
ions and overruled cases. To a slight extent it is supported by
judicial decisions and un-overruled opinions. In State ex rel.
Wright v. Barlow,75 the court said: "We have reached the defi-
nite conclusion that this court is vested with the exclusive power
to determine the qualifications of persons who may be permitted
to practice law in this state and possesses the exclusive power
to disbar licensed attorneys who have been unfaithful to the trust
which the court has reposed in them." This was an original ac-
tion to adjudge the defendant, a county judge but not a licensed
attorney, in contempt of court for practicing law by giving legal
advice outside of court. One of the defenses was the existence
of a statute regulating the practice of law and prescribing only
one sanction, namely, punishment as for a crime, and therefore
the Legislature had "excluded" the court from the field. The
court ruled against this defense, using the language quoted above.
There was no direct ruling that the criminal statute was uncon-
stitutional. If there should be a prosecution under the criminal
statute, the issue would be clearly raised.
State ex inf. v. Shepherdt7o was a case involving alleged con-
tempt of the Supreme Court of Missouri by a newspaper editor.
The Supreme Court en banc unanimously decided that determin-
ing what are contempts against the administration of justice, and
punishing such contempts, were matters exclusively within the
limits of judicial power. The respondent relied upon a legisla-
tive act which seemed to curtail the judicial power. The court
expressly held "that the legislature exceeded its powers when it
enacted section 1616, Revised Statutes 1899, and that this court
has an inherent and constitutional right to punish contempt sum-
marily, which cannot be taken away, abridged, limited or regu-
lated by the legislature.' ' 77
75. 131 Neb. 294, 301, 268 N. W. 95, 98 (1936).
76. 177 Mo. 205, 76 S. W. 79, 99 Am. St. Rep. 624 (1903).
77. 177 Mo. 205, 238, 76 S. W. 79, 89, 99 Am. St. Rep. 624, 648 (1903).
The condemned statutory section, amended materially, is now R. S. Mo.
1929, sec. 1864.
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The holding and the reasoning of the case last cited were fol-
lowed six years later by the same court en bane when Chicago B.
& Q. Ry. Co. v. Gildersleeve8 was decided, although three of the
seven judges dissented. The majority opinion stated in effect
that the constitutional courts of Missouri have unlimited power
to punish for contempt and that the legislature cannot pass laws
on that subject because, if it could, it might enact unreasonable
laws destroying that power. The doctrine of inherent and ex-
clusive power in matters of contempt was afterwards abandon-
ed by the Supreme Court of Missouri in the case of Ex parte
Creasy,79 decided by the court en bane without any dissent.
In territorial days Oklahoma was committed to the unlimited,
inherent theory of judicial control over contempts, 0 and appar-
ently this is still the law in Oklahoma, except insofar as the con-
stitution has placed some express limitations on the judicial
power over contempts8 •
In re Removal of Janitor of the Supreme Court8" had to do
with the effort of a statutory official, purporting to act under a
statute, to remove from office an appointee of the supreme court.
The supreme court denied the power in the statutory official to
make the removal. The decision was based in part upon a favored
construction of an ambiguous statute, and in part upon the as-
serted "power inherent in every court of record, and especially a
court of last resort, to appoint such assistants. ' 82
The above cited case of Clark v. Austin83 was unanimous
in result but not in reasoning. The able but rather mechanistic
dissenting opinion by Judge Frank is based upon the strict theory
of a rigid separation of governmental powers with an excessive-
78. 219 Mo. 170, 118 S. W. 86, 16 Ann. Cas. 749 (1909); cited with ap-
parent approval in note 34 Harv. L. Rev. 424 (1921).
79. 243 Mo. 679, 148 S. W. 914, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 478 (1912). The
opinion in the Shepherd case, 177 Mo. 205, 76 S. W. 79, 99 Am. St. Rep.
624 (1903), has been much criticized. Three observations may be made:
(1) The contempt was outrageous. (2) The statute held unconstitutional
was in the nature of a frustrating statute. (3) The court could have reached
the same result without claiming an inherent and exclusive control over
contempts.
80. Smith v. Speed, 11 Old. 95, 66 Pac. 511, 55 L. R. A. 402 (1901).
81. State ex rel. Short v. Owens, 125 Old. 66, 256 Pac. 704 (1927); Ex
parte Owens, 37 Old. Crim. Rep. 118, 258 Pac. 758 (1927). To the same
effect: State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384 (1855) (a contempt case).
81a. 35 Wis. 410 (1874).
82 Supra, note 81a, 1. c. 419.
83. 101 S. W. (2d) 977 (Mo. 1937).
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ly logical exclusion of all legislative power from the judicial do-
main. He deems it proper to hold unconstitutional even penal
statutes defining the practice of law and prescribing a punish-
ment for the illegal practice of law. Judge Frank says:
"We agree with the holding that the power to define and
regulate the practice of law is, in its exercise, judicial and
not legislative, but we do not agree with the further hold-
ing that the exercise of such power may be regulated by
statute. If it be correct to hold that such power is judicial,
then it is not correct to hold that the exercise of such power
may be reasonably regulated by the Legislature, in face of
the constitutional injunction that the legislative depart-
ment of government shall not encroach upon the powers and
functions properly belonging to the judicial department."84
The doctrine of legislative supremacy. Some courts have de-
cided cases involving conflict between judicial power and legis-
lative power in the non-procedural border-land by asserting or
assuming that the legislature is clothed with law-making power
over all subjects except insofar as the power is expressly cur-
tailed by the state and federal constitutions. In re Waugh85 was
an original disbarment proceeding in'the Supreme Court of
Washington. The allegations clearly indicated that the respon-
dent was never qualified to be an attorney, but had obtained
admission by fraud on a trial court. Since the constitution did
not expressly confer original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court
in disbarment cases and since a statute conferred such jurisdic-
tion on the trial courts, a demurrer to the petition was sustained.
The court said: "The inherent power of a court is an undefined
quantity and an undefinable term, and courts have indulged in
more or less loose expressions concerning it. It must necessarily
be that the court has inherent power to preserve its existence
and to fully protect itself in the orderly administration of its
business. Its inherent power will not carry it beyond this."8 6 Two
of five judges dissented. As applied to contempts, the leading
case supporting the doctrine of legislative supremacy is Ex parte
HickeyY7
84. Supra, note 83, 1. c. 980.
85. 32 Wash. 50, 72 Pac. 710 (1903).
86. In re Waugh, 32 Wash. 50, 51, 72 Pac. 710 (1903). To the same
effect: State v. Foreman, 3 Mo. 602 (1834).
87. 4 Smed. & Mar. (12 Miss.) 751 (1845).
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The doctrine of comity. Many judicial opinions have avoided
serious examination of this constitutional problem by using the
concept of comity borrowed from private international law. "In
the matter of contempt we have never gone further than to rule
that as a matter of comity between the separate departments of
the state government, we would recognize such reasonable re-
strictions imposed by the legislature."'8 This doctrine admits too
much. The foreign statute in private international law is recog-
nized as valid in the first instance. The local forum then decides
as a matter of local policy whether the valid foreign law is to be
locally adopted and applied. A frustrating statute tending to
cripple or destroy the administration of justice is never valid but
ultra vires the legislature and hence is unconstitutional.
SECTION 7: THE DOCTRINE OF LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY
IN THE FIELD OF PROCEDURE.
As above indicated, procedure in this article means pleading
and practice. In this domain of procedure, what is the degree
of authority possessed by statutes when compared with common
law, and what is the degree of authority possessed by statutes
when compared with gelieral rules of court? All American law-
yers will give the same answer: Unless a statute is unconsti-
tutional, it will prevail over a conflicting principle of the common
law or a rule of court.
The small group of American lawyers who now assert that
courts have an inherent power to prescribe rules of procedure in
contravention of statutes are forced to admit as intelligent law-
yers that all statutes regulating procedure are and always have
been unconstitutional.8 9
Do judges in the judicial department of a typical American
state have the power to prescribe, outside the course of litigation,
new rules of court which will regulate procedure, it being under-
stood that the judges have not received a specific, grant of rule-
making power by constitutional provision or legislative enact-
ment? In every decade between 1790 and 1920 the answer to
that question was a unanimous no. Since 1920 there have been
some suggestions made in respectable quarters that our profes-
88. In re Hagen, 295 Mo. 435, 442, 245 S. W. 336, 337 (1922). To the
same effect: In re Greathouse, 189 Minn. 51, 60, 248 N. W. 735, 739 (1933);
State v. Cannon, 196 Wis. 534, 538, 221 N. W. 603, 604 (1928).
89. See Section 9 of this article.
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sional ancestors, at the bar and on the bench, were wrong; that
the legislature at Jefferson City in 1849 and many other legis-
latures in the nineteenth century usurped unconstitutional power
when they adopted David Dudley Field's Code of Civil Proce-
dure; that our Missouri Code of Criminal Procedure is also un-
constitutional; that the old system was bad but it was made by
judges and therefore should be revised by judges; that there was
no legal justification for what the young legislators did, although
perhaps there was a moral justification in the ignorance, timid-
ity and laziness of the old judges; that the judges of each state
had the power, by reason of the fact that they administered com-
mon law and equity in courts established by a constitution, to get
together and prescribe new rules of court to operate prospec-
tively, which could have combined law and equity, could have ex-
tended the possibilities of joinder of parties litigant and of causes
of action, could have changed the effect of writs of summons,
could have regulated the lien-producing effect of a judgment and
could have modified any of the thousand and one details of pro-
cedure, that is, pleading and practice, which latter term includes
process, writs, judgments, and executions.
Many excellent arguments can be made, and have been made,
for a lodgment in the courts of a new rule-making power which
would grant to them the function of creating permanent direc-
tions for pleading and practice, to be binding even if in contra-
vention of statutes. England, the United States, and ten of our
states have, by constitutional provision or legislative enactment,
conferred this power upon the courts.90 The wisdom of this lodg-
ment of power in the courts is outside the scope of this article.
The scope of this article includes a brief consideration of this
question: Do our American state courts, without a constitutional
or legislative grant of power to regulate procedure, possess the
inherent, implied, constitutional power to prescribe rules of pro-
cedure in contravention of statutes? Of course, this is a question
of American constitutional law. It is quite true that the typical
American state constitution has an article which in express
terms creates a judicial department as a separate branch of
sovereignty, independent of the legislature. That means it is
independent when acting judicially within its orbit as outlined
90. See Section 3 of this article.
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expressly or impliedly by the constitution. The typical state
constitution expressly creates certain courts and expressly con-
fers upon those courts jurisdiction at law and in equity. The
constitution makes certain express delegations of original and
appellate jurisdiction. The typical constitution also grants to
the appellate courts a superintending control over the lower
courts and tribunals (such as was possessed by the King's Bench
over the inferior common-law courts and statutory tribunals).
This paraphrase of a typical state constitutional provision
would be meaningless without a reasonably clear notion of the
technical terms lw and equity. These terms do not mean the
same thing in Paris or Buenos Aires that they mean on the banks
of the Thames or the levees of the Mississippi0, As these terms
are used in our American state constitutions (and also in our
federal constitution) they mean the common law and equity of
England at the time of the American Revolution as received in
each state and modified by local custom.
Ross v. Rittenhouse92 involved a question of procedure, and in
deciding it Chief Justice McKean invoked "the genius and spirit
of the common law of England which is the law of Pennsyl-
vania." In United States v. Wonson,93 Judge Story examined
English cases to distinguish a writ of error from a statutory ap-
peal and referred to "the common law of England, the grand
reservoir of all our jurisprudence." For the collection of debts
due the federal government from a fiscal officer, a summary pro-
cess authorized by Congress and sanctioned by long usage in
England before the American Revolution was held valid as not
violating the due-process clause in Murray v. Hoboken Land
Co.14 The court said:
"We must examine the constitution itself, to see whether
this process be in conflict with any of its provisions. If not
found to be so, we must look to those settled usages and
modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute
law of England, before the emigration of our ancestors,
and which are shown not to have been unsuited to their
91. The late Augustine Birrell used to say that he never knew anybody
outside the legal profession who understood the meaning of law and equity
as those terms are used in English jurisprudence.
92. 1 Yeates 443, 457 (Pa. 1792) 2 Dell. 160, 163, 1 L. ed. 331, 332.
93. 1 Gall. 5 (C. C. D. Mass.) 28 Fed. Cas. (No. 16750) 745, 750 (1812).
94. 18 How. (59 U. S.) 272, 15 L. ed. 372 (1856).
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civil and political condition by having been acted on by
them after the settlement of this country."95
Clark v. Allaman"r was decided in territory originally French,
afterwards Spanish, and now American, but never English. The
court said: "Among the most elementary of our legal concepts
is that of the adoption of the English common law as the basis
of American jurisprudence." In Aetna Accident and Liability
Company v. Miller, Receiver97 a receivership case, the assignee
of the state's claim against an insolvent bank was held to be a
preferred claim, in the absence of any controlling statute, for
the following reason: "At the time the territory of Montana was
organized and first formally adopted the common law as our
rule of decision in the absence of statutes, there existed a vast
number of decided cases from almost all of the states holding
that divers and sundry prerogatives ascribed to the King at
common law had passed to the states."
The first generation of American lawyers after the Revolu-
tion certainly would never have claimed for American courts any
power in procedural matters adverse to legislative power mani-
fested through statutes in the same field, unless such power was
within the common-law and equity powers of the English courts.
At the time of the American Revolution, did the justices and
barons of the English common-law courts, and the Lord Chan-
cellor, possess the power to promulgate general rules of court
in contravention of acts of Parliament? If the answer is yes,
then there is a plausible argument that our constitutional courts
have inherent power to make rules of procedure in contraven-
tion of statutes. If the answer is no, then certain zealous law-
yers who (with the best of motives) are yearning for a particu-
lar reform should stop talking about "inherent power to ignore
the legislature" and should stop repeating that "the constitution
means what the judges say it means." The judges have taken
an oath of office. What these zealous lawyers should do is to
work for a transfer, by constitutional amendment or legislative
act, of procedural rule-making power to the judiciary.
95. 18 How. (59 U. S.) 272, 277, 15 L. ed. 372, 374 (1856).
96. 71 Kan. 206, 215, 80 Pac. 571, 574, 70 L. R. A. 971 (1905). This case
gives an historical outline of the reception of the common law in Missouri
as well as in Kansas.
97. 54 Mont. 377, 382, 170 Pac. 760, 761, L. R. A. 1918C 954 (1918).
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No American judge will ever assert that he has greater power
than the English judges and chancellors of the eighteenth cen-
tury, except insofar as our constitutions and statutes have ex-
pressly or impliedly enlarged his powers.
Those terms law and equity which appear in our state and
federal constitutions are links in a chain binding our American
courts to the institutions of Blackstone, Mansfield, Hale, Roll,
Ellsmere, Coke, Bracton, Glanvil, and the barons at Runnymead.
It is not to be expected that our American courts will be non-
chalant and superficial if called upon to determine whether there
is a power to nullify statutes implied in the terms law and equity,
which must be interpreted as English technical terms of the
eighteenth century except insofar as modified by colonial cus-
toms, and constitutional law, on this side of the Atlantic.
Professor Holdsworth says that even Coke, although uttering
some bold dicta as to the fundamental nature of the common law,
frankly admitted the ultimate supremacy of Parliament, and
from Coke's death down to the present time there has been no
question as to the inability of any British tribunal or official to
ignore or modify an act of Parliament.9 8
At the end of an elaborate description of redress by suit in
court, Blackstone said:
"But this intricacy of our legal process will be found,
when attentively considered, to be one of those troublesome,
but not dangerous, evils, which have their root in the frame
of our constitution, and which therefore can never be cured
without hazarding everything that is dear to us. In absolute
governments, when new arrangements of property and a
gradual change of manners have destroyed the original ideas
on which the laws were devised and established, the prince
by his edict may promulgate a new code, more suited to the
present emergencies. But when laws are to be framed by
popular assemblies, even of the representative kind, it is too
herculean a task to begin the work of legislation afresh, and
extract a new system from the discordant opinions of more
than five hundred counsellors."'' °
We may not admit the wisdom of Blackstone's fear of legisla-
tion. But there can be no dissent from the correctness of his
conclusion about the sole power of Parliament consciously to
98. 4 Holdsworth, History of English Law (1924) 186-187.
99. 3 1. Com. (1765) *267.
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create remedial alterations in the common law of procedure,
either directly or by a delegation of power. (Of course, the power
of the courts judicially to change the common law by decisions
in the course of litigation is quite different from the power to
make changes for the future by promulgating new rules of
court.) In another place, Blackstone is even more emphatic.
After describing the parliamentary routine of passing a bill and
obtaining the royal assent thereto, Blackstone said:
"An act of parliament, thus made, is the exercise of the
highest authority that this kingdom acknowledges upon
earth. It hath power to bind every subject in the land, and
the dominions thereunto belonging; nay, even the king him-
self, if particularly named therein. And it cannot be altered,
amended, dispensed with, suspended, or repealed, but in the
same forms, and by the same authority of parliament: for
it is a maxim in law, that it requires the same strength to
dissolve, as to create, an obligation."'100
If it can be shown that the common law of England, when
transplanted to this country, was modified through public opin-
ion, registered in official action, so as to authorize colonial courts
to promulgate prospective rules in contravention of statutes and
the common law of procedure, then it would be quite proper to
assert that a modern state constitution, by conferring jurisdic-
tion at law and in equity upon the constitutional courts, had im-
pliedly authorized those courts to promulgate superstatutory
rules. It is true that the colonial and early republican courts
showed much independence in modifying common law and equity
through their judicial decisions in the course of litigation, and
thus they built up some new and distinctive American rules of
law. Francis Wharton has pointed out the importance of this
process in the legal history of Pennsylvania."" But there is an
100. 1 B1. Com. (1765) *185.
101. Wharton, Commentaries on Law (1884) sec. 2. In thinking about
the formative period of American jurisprudence, perhaps we pay too much
attention to the appellate judges and not enough to the trial judges. Those
trial judges must have had a lot of common-sense and independence. In
Pennsylvania and Massachusetts there never were any separate courts of
chancery, and until well along in the nineteenth century there was no
general adoption of equity by the constitution or statutes. And yet by a
remarkable series of interlocutory decisions and final judgments the trialjudges expanded the common-law actions so as to apply much of the sub-
stantive part of equity for the benefit of both plaintiffs and defendants. This
was sometimes justified on the theory that the Court of Exchequer had
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entire dearth of legal or historical authority for asserting that
the colonial courts assumed any conscious power to formulate
prospective rules in contravention of statutes regulating proce-
dure. The earliest American descriptions of rules of court all
assume that they are and must remain subordinate to legislation
unless a superseding quality is conferred upon them by legisla-
tive or constitutional grant.
In Barry v. Randolplo2 a rule relating to appeals to the court
of common pleas from a lower statutory court was challenged
as in conflict with a statute, but sustained because of no conflict.
Judge Jasper Yeates said: "A rule of the same kind precisely
subsisted before the American Revolution. It is true that no
rule can be made which would divest a citizen of any legal right."
Other early American cases recognizing the legislative suprem-
acy in the field of procedural law are cited in the footnote.10
It should be remembered that the American Revolution was
not a fight against the common law of England. It was a fight to
get the common law of England established in America. It was
a rebellion against the official English doctrine that English gov-
ernmental rights in the plantations of America were acquired,
not through colonization, but through conquest. "And, there-
fore," as Blackstone said, "the common law of England, as such,
has no allowance or authority there; they being no part of the
mother country, but distinct, though dependent dominions.''0 4
As a reply to this doctrine the Continental Congress in its Decla-
ration of Rights, 0 5 stated: "That the respective colonies are en-
titled to the common law of England, and more especially to the
great and inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of
the vicinage, according to the course of that law."
The attitude of the late colonial and early republican judges
equity jurisdiction. But issues of fact were always tried by a jury. Story,
Equity (12th ed. 1877) sec. 57; Wharton, Commentaries on Law (1884)
sec. 113; 7 Dane, Abridgment of American Law (1924) 516-639.
102. 3 Binn. 277, 279 (Pa. 1810).
103. Dubosq v. Guardians of the Poor, 1 Binn. 415 (Pa. 1808) ; Vanatta
v. Anderson, 3 Binn. 417 (Pa. 1811); Snyder v. Bauchman, 8 Serg. & R.
336 (Pa. 1822); Thompson v. Hatch, 3 Pick. (20 Mass.) 512 (1826);
Risher v. Thomas, 2 Mo. 98 (1828).
104. 1 Bl. Com. (1765) *108; quoted and criticized by Story, Commenta-
ries on the Constitution (5th ed. 1891) sees. 151 and 152.
105. Sec. 5 (1774); quoted by Pound and Plucknett, Readings on the
Common Law (1927) 309. The book contains additional data on the Ameri-
can reception of the English common law.
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was one of extreme loyalty, not to say servility, toward the En-
glish judicial system as it existed for the benefit of Englishmen
in England. On August 8, 1791, the United States Supreme
Court adopted its original Rule VII 06 in these words:
"The chief justice, in answer to the motion of the attor-
ney-general, made yesterday, informs him and the bar, that
this court considers the practice of the courts of King's
Bench, and of Chancery, in England, as affording outlines
for the practice of this court; and they will from time to
time, make such alterations therein as circumstances may
render necessary.' 10 7
(Of course, practice here means customs and court rules not in
conflict with rules of law or statutes.) Certainly the lawyers who
practiced in the federal supreme court were not induced by this
language to reject the fundamental English doctrine of proce-
dure that, when the legislature passes a statute, the statute is
supreme.
In the nineteenth century there was very little text-book treat-
ment of the rule-making power in this country. Perhaps the best
was by Joel P. Bishop.""" He said: "A rule is invalid when con-
travening a statute or any doctrine of established law."" 9 In
the twentieth century a widely used encyclopedia stated the gen-
erally accepted principle in these words: [The rule-making power
is] "not absolute but subject to limitations based on reasonable-
ness and conformity to constitutional and statutory provisions."
In support of the principle, ninety-nine cases from forty-five
appellate courts are cited.-o
106. 1 Cranch xvii, 2 L. ed. 13 (1791). John Jay was Chief Justice, and
Edmond Randolph was attorney-general. For the attorney-general's motion
see 2 Dall. 411, 1 L. ed. 437 (1792).
107. Criticized as too "difficult for an American lawyer to correctly un-
derstand," 6 Dane Abridgment of American Law (1823) 550.
108. Bishop, Marriage and Divorce (6th ed. 1881) secs. 80-86.
109. Supra, note 108, sec. 84.
110. 15 C. J., Courts (1918) 901-902, sec. 276. Some more recent cases
are: McMann v. Hamilton, 202 Cal. 319, 260 Pac. 793 (1927) (rule tested
by statute and held valid); State ex rel. Brockman Manufacturing Co. v.
Miller, 241 S. W. 920 (Mo. 1922) (rule tested by statute and held valid);
State ex rel. Paramount Progressive Order of Moose v. Miller, 216 Mo. App.
692, 273 S. W. 122 (1925) (rule tested by statute and held valid); Bank
of Beaverton v. Goodwin, 124 Ore. 166, 264 Pac. 356 (1928) (rule limiting
discretion of judges in extending time for filing a pleading, held invalid
because of conflict with statute) ; Carroll v. Quaker City Cab. Co., 308 Pa.
345, 162 At]. 258 (1934) (rule limiting time for issuing writ held invalid
because of conflict with statute).
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Of the twentieth-century-fourth-decade cases perhaps the best
considered is from Arizona.,' The legislature in 1901 granted to
the Supreme Court power to make "rules of practice" for the
trial courts without any specific utterance that the rules would
or would not be subordinate to statutes."2 In 1932, the Supreme
Court promulgated a rather lengthy and involved rule applying
to "any demurrer, motion or similar pleading."" 3 When, in 1935,
a trial court's attention was called to a conflict between this rule
and a statute relating to motions for a new trial, the court made
a decision in accord with the statute and not in accord with the
rule. The Supreme Court sustained this decision, saying: "In so
far as there is a constitutional statute in regard to practice which
provides for a certain method of procedure, that statute prevails
over a rule made by the court which is in conflict therewith.""14
SECTION 8: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE DOCTRINE
OF LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY.
Some impatient lawyers, eager to establish the doctrine that
a state supreme court, without any express constitutional or leg-
islative grant of power, can promulgate general rules of proce-
dure in contravention of statutes, have diligently searched
through recent digests and reports and have reprinted in red ink,
as it were, all cases in which a state supreme court has declared
unconstitutional any particular statute in any way touching on
procedure. Many particular statutes in the field of contracts have
been declared unconstitutional. It does not follow that the su-
preme court of a state can promulgate a new code of contract
law and abrogate pre-existing statutes. It is quite true, as will
be indicated in Section 10, that promulgating new rules of pro-
cedure is a judicial function in the sense that a grant of power
by the legislature expressly authorizing the judicial department
to promulgate superstatutory rules of procedure is not an uncon-
stitutional delegation of legislative power, and will not wreck the
Sacred Temple of the Three Powers. Until lawyers, in a state
like Missouri, have enough influence with the legislature, or the
voters (who possess the initiative and referendum franchise),
111. De Camp v. Central Arizona L. & P. Co., 57 P. (2d) 311 (Ariz.
1936).
112. Supra, note 111, 1. c. 313.
113. Supra, note 111, 1. c. 312.
114. Supra, note 111, 1. c. 313.
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to obtain a grant of superstatutory rule-making power for the
judicial department, it would be well for lawyers to remember
that stare decisis is still operative in the courts, and that the tri-
bunalistic history of English law in the eighteenth century and
of American law in the nineteenth century will be studied by
judges in the future, when deciding novel issues, as in the past.
The Magna Carta of the modern advocates of judicial omnip-
otence is Judge Stephen Field's opinion in the case of Houston
v. Williams.'15 In 1854, California adopted a statute which in
terms provided "that all opinions given upon an appeal in any
Appellate Court of this State, shall be in writing, with the reason
therefor, and filed with the Clerk of the Court."' 16 Five years
later the Supreme Court on appeal reversed a certain judgment.
No written opinion was filed. A party litigant petitioned the
court to file a written opinion. The petition was denied. The
court said:
"The provision of the statute had not been overlooked
when the decision was rendered. It is but one of many pro-
visions embodied in different statutes by which control over
the Judiciary Department of the government has been at-
tempted by legislation. To accede to it any obligatory force
would be to sanction a most palpable encroachment upon
the independence of this department. If the power of the
Legislature to prescribe the mode and manner in which the
Judiciary shall discharge their official duties be once recog-
nized, there will be no limit to the dependence of the latter.
If the Legislature can require the reasons of our decisions
to be stated in writing, it can forbid their statement in
writing, and enforce their oral announcement, or prescribe
the paper upon which they shall be written, and the ink
which shall be used. And yet no sane man will justify any
such absurd pretension, but where is the limit to this power
if its exercise in any particular be admitted?
"The truth is, no such power can exist in the Legislative
Department, or be sanctioned by any Court which has the
least respect for its own dignity and independence. In its
own sphere of duties, this Court cannot be trammeled by any
legislative restrictions. Its constitutional duty is discharged
by the rendition of decisions. The Legislature can no more
require this Court to state the reasons of its decisions, than
this Court can require, for the validity of the statutes, that
115. 13 Cal. 24, 73 Am Dec. 565 (1859).
116. 13 Cal. 24, 25.
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the Legislature shall accompany them with the reasons for
their enactment. The principles of law settled are to be ex-
tracted from the records of the cases in which the decisions
are rendered. The reports are full of adjudged cases, in
which opinions were never delivered. The facts are stated
by the Reporter, with the points arising thereon, and are
followed by the judgments rendered, and yet no one ever
doubted that the Courts, in the instances mentioned, were
discharging their entire constitutional obligations.11117
An historiani 1B has told us that this emphatic declaration of
independence from the quill pen of a great but very human judge
was an episode in a petty but protracted quarrel between the
judges of the court and certain newspapers of Sacramento, in
which the legislators and the governor took sides with the news-
papers.119 The actual decision in Houston v. Williams'0 was
sound. In the absence of any mandate in the constitution, the
writing of opinions by an appellate judge is obviously a matter
of inherent judicial discretion, and a statute attempting to im-
pose such a duty on the judiciary would be an unconstitutional
trespass on the judicial department as established by organic
law. The case of Homer v. AmickL1 goes even further and holds
that a constitutional provision, rhetorically a command to write
opinions, is directory only.
In Thoe, Adm., v. Chicago M. and St. P. R. Co.,'2 a statute had
the effect of taking away from the trial court the right to direct
117. 13 Cal. 24, 25 and 26. The last sentence in the passage quoted in
the text naturally raises a question. Suppose all American appellate judges
would stop writing opinions and would merely decide cases. Would thosejudges be "discharging their entire constitutional obligations"--even in
states where the constitutions are silent about opinions? Of course we have
too many judicial opinions. But could we, and the next generation of Amer-
icans, get along without any opinions at all? Perhaps the ideal system is
that prevailing in the New York Court of Appeals. The judges write
opinions only in cases involving novel points of law. In each of the other
cases the decision alone is printed, with a brief indication of the procedural
history of the case, prepared by the Reporter.
118. Swisher, Stephen J. Field, Craftsman of the Law (1930) 105-109.
119. Later on there was a knifing and talk about a duel and charges of
cowardice against Field from which he suffered bitterly and which perhaps
had some causal relation to the case of In-re Neagle, 135 U. S. 1, 10 S. Ct.
658, 34 L. ed. 55 (1889). Supra, note 118.
120. 13 Cal. 24, 73 Am. Dec. 565 (1859). To same effect: Ex parte
Griffiths, 118 Ind. 83, 20 N. E. 513 (1888); Vaughan v. Harp, 49 Ark. 16,
4 S. W. 751 (1887).
121. 64 W. Va. 172, 61 S. E. 40 (1908).
122. 181 Wis. 456, 195 N. W. 407, 29 A. L. R. 1280 (1923).
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a verdict in any jury case. Reluctantly and with more courtesy
than was shown in California, the Wisconsin court upheld the
action of the trial judge in disregarding the statute as an assault
upon the constitutional functions of the judiciary.
Riglander v. Star Co. 123 involved a statute which apparently
controlled absolutely the order in which certain cases should be
tried. It was held that the act was invalid because it deprived
"the courts of the right to exercise that judicial discretion which
has always been their prerogative."' 24 Partly on the authority
of the Riglander case, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held un-
constitutional a statute in the nature of a command that in a
certain class of cases the trial court should always try each case
within ten days after defendant's answer was filed.'2-
In all the cases above cited in this section, the conflict was
between a mandatory statute relating to procedure on the one
hand, and on the other hand, an unformulated principle of judi-
cial discretion so essential to the free exercise of the judicial
function as to justify the courts in holding that there was an
inherent duty to protect the judicial function derived directly
from the constitution. If the courts first prescribe a general rule
of procedure, clearly relating to an inherent judicial function,
and then the legislature enacts a conflicting statute, it is the duty
of the court, after careful reconsideration of the matter, to hold
the statute unconstitutional. For a court not to do so would be
to surrender a chief characteristic of American jurisprudence,
the function of judicially reviewing any legislation when chal-
lenged on constitutional grounds.
Several Indiana cases decided during the past two decades in-
volved a conflict between rules of the Supreme Court, obviously
designed to encourage the fair, prompt and convenient dispatch
of appellate business, and statutes authorizing loose and sloppy
professional work by attorneys for litigants in the Supreme
Court.
In Epstein v. State2' the appellant admitted that he failed to
123. 98 App. Div. 101, 90 N. Y. Supp. 772 (1904), aff'd 181 N. Y. 531,
73 N. E. 1131 (1905).
124. 90 N. Y. Supp. 775 (1904).
125. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Long, 122 Old. 86, 251 Pac.
486 (1926).
126. 190 Ind. 693, 128 N. E. 353 (1920). See note, 34 Harv. L. Rev.
424 (1921).
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comply with a certain rule of the court, which required that "the
briefs shall set out a concise statement of so much of the record
as presents every error and exception relied on."'127 He contended
that a statute passed after the rule was promulgated had the
effect of abolishing the rule. The holding was in favor of the
rule. The court said: "This court is a constitutional court, and
as such receives its essential and inherent powers, rights and
jurisdiction from the Constitution, and not from the legislature,
and it has power to prescribe rules for its own direct govern-
ment independent of legislative enactment.' 1 28 This language is
broader than is necessary. But the holding is quite sound and
by no means unprecedented. Other Indian cases are cited in the
footnote.129
That the Supreme Court of Indiana in the cases just referred
to in the text and footnote did not intend to recognize any un-
usual judicial power to make superstatutory rules of practice in
the trial courts is evident from a still more recent case, Barber
v. State.1" 0 In this latter case the issue was between the right of
a litigant (not the convenience of an attorney) as protected by
the statute, and a rule of the trial court in conflict with the stat-
ute. The Supreme Court of Indiana did not hesitate to call the
rule invalid. This was a murder case in which the right of a
defendant to a change of judge secured to him by the statute was
erroneously denied by the trial court in reliance on a conflicting
general rule of court.
Turner v. Anderson 3 in effect held invalid a statutory pro-
vision requiring detailed contents of opinions filed in the appel-
late courts. The case last cited in the text is also interesting be-
cause of another point discussed but not before the court as an
issue. The Constitution of Missouri makes it mandatory for divi-
sional opinions of the Supreme Court to be written and filed.
The Constitution also makes it mandatory for opinions in the
courts of appeals to be written and filed. There is no provision
127. 190 Ind. 693, 695, 128 N. E. 353 (1920).
128. 190 Ind. 693, 696, 128 N. E. 353 (1920).
129. Roberts v. Donahoe, 191 Ind. 98, 131 N. E. 33 (1921) (time of
,objecting to transcript on appeal); Davis v. Indiana, 189 Ind. 464, 128
N. E. 354 (1920) (contents of transcripts on appeals); Solimeto v. State,
188 Ind. 170, 122 N. E. 578 (1919) (contents of brief on appeal).
130. 197 Ind. 88, 149 N. E. 896 (1925).
131. 236 Mo. 523, 139 S. W. 180 (1911). To the same effect: Smarr v.
.Smarr, 319 Mo. 1153, 6 S. W. (2d) 860 (1928).
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in the Constitution for opinions of the Supreme Court en bane
to be written and filed. A statute clearly commands that in each
case determined by the Supreme Court "the opinion of the court
shall be reduced to writing and filed." 1 2 The divisional opinion
(of Judge Lamm) in the instant case included an elaborate dic-
tum patently intimating that the statute is unconstitutional in-
sofar as it applies to the court en bane.1"' As a matter of fact,
this statute is not always followed by the Missouri Supreme
Court en bane, when exercising its original jurisdiction.
North Carolina's constitution gives to the General Assembly
express authority to make rules of procedure for all courts "be-
low" the Supreme Court. 34 By construction of the constitution
the Supreme Court has developed a doctrine of procedural inde-
pendence with rule-making power for conducting business in its
own tribunal-which, however, does not seem to be unique in
practical effect. 35
The cases cited in this Section 8 show that American state
courts are aware of their constitutional duty to protect the judi-
cial function from frustrating legislation. They do not show that
ordinary and reasonable practice acts relating to the fundamen-
tals of trial procedure are outside the constitutional orbit of
legislative activity. And it would be a mistake to suppose that
there is anything novel about the doctrine of this Section 8, or
that it started with the petulance of Judge Field in California.
In early manhood Chief Justice Gibson was opposed to the doc-
trine of judicial review. But when he was older he accepted it and
applied it. In 1847, the Pennsylvania legislature passed an act
in terms granting a new trial to a defeated litigant. (There was
no constitutional inhibition against special laws.) The trial court
refused to proceed under the statute. A writ of error was sued
out as of course. In vigorous language the Supreme Court, speak-
132. R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 1067.
133. Turner v. Anderson, 236 Mo. 523, 139 S. W. 180 (1911). The deci-
sion in Houston v. Williams, 39 Cal. 24, 73 Am. Dec. 565 (1859), was cited
with approval.
134. Art. 4, sec. 2; see also Art. 1, sec. 8.
135. Lacy v. State, 195 N. C. 284, 141 S. E. 886 (1928) ; State v. Ward,
184 N. C. 618, 113 S. E. 775 (1922); Cooper v. Board of Commissioners,
184 N. C. 615, 113 S. E. 569 (1922); Herndon v. Imperial Fire Ins. Co.,
111 N. C. 384, 16 S. E. 465 (1892).
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ing through Chief Justice Gibson, upheld the trial court, saying:
"The act before us is null."'136
SECTION 9: THE DOCTRINE OF INHERENT AND EXCLUSIVE
JUDICIAL RULE-MAKING POWER IN THE FIELD OF PROCEDURE.
t
Hanna v. Mitchel113 was a very important case which involved
the validity of the general rule of court applying to all trial
courts of the state and authorizing summary judgment in certain
cases where verified allegations on one side were not combated
by counter-affidavits on the other side. Three justiciable issues
were raised and decided. (1) The rule was promulgated by a
convention of judges duly authorized by the legislature to act,
(2) The rule did not violate the constitutional right of trial by
jury. (3) The rule was not inconsistent with the Civil Practice
Act passed by the legislature.
The opinion of Judge Page138 is quite sound on the issues in-
volved and contains a scholarly and useful but far from com-
prehensive treatment of the history of judicial power in New
York from the seventeenth century to the time of the decision.
The opinion contains this misleading dictum: "The power to
make rules governing the practice and procedure in the courts
is a judicial, and not a legislative, power. This was clearly
recognized when the Code of Civil Procedure [of 1848] was au-
thorized to be-adopted by the legislature. A change in the Con-
stitution was found necessary to confer the power upon the
legislature."1389
This utterance has nothing whatever to do with the issues of
the case as set forth in the memorandum opinion of affirmance
in the Court of Appeals. 40 It is true that the New York Consti-
tution of 1846 contained a mandate to the legislature for the
appointment of three commissioners to draft a new set of rules
136. De Chastellux v. Fairchild, 15 Pa. St. 18, 21 (1850). To the same
effect: Dorsey v. Dorsey, 37 Md. 64 (1872).
137. 196 N. Y. Supp. 43 (1922), aff'd 235 N. Y. 534, 139 N. E. 724
(1923).
138. Chairman of the Biennial Convention of Judges (1921) which
adopted this particular rule authorizing summary judgment. The Conven-
tions formerly met under authority of Consol. Laws 1909, c. 35, p. 1898. The
old law apparently has been modified and judges of the Appellate Division
now take action by referendum vote. New York, Cahill's Consol. Laws
1930, c. 31, sec. 82.
139. Hanna v. Mitchell, 196 N. Y. Supp. 43, 51 (1922).
140. Hanna v. Mitchell, 235 N. Y. 534, 139 N. E. 724 (1923).
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of procedure and "to report thereon to the legislature, subject to
their adoption and modification from time to time."''1 To assert
in the twentieth century that the original Field Code in New
York would have been unconstitutional if it had not been for
this express provision of the New York Constitution of 1846 is
startling in the extreme. For historical reasons the doctrine may
not lead to any confusion in New York. But if this dictum should
be accepted as accurate, an enormous amount of confusion would
result in Missouri and more than a score of other states whose
legislatures adopted the Field Code without any specific consti-
tutional authorization. The Illinois Practice Act of 1933142 would
also be unconstitutional because it was enacted by the legislature
without any express constitutional authorization.
The natural meaning of the New York constitutional provi-
sion is this: The legislature was ordered by the people forthwith
to appoint three commissioners who were ordered in advance
by the people to do a particular job, but the people did not grant
to the commissioners any final legislative power. The commis-
sioners' report was to be what the French call a projet de loi.
It was not to be infused with validity unless and until the legis-
lature acted favorably. But there is nothing in the Constitution
of 1846 to justify the inference that without specific constitu-
tional authorization the legislature was impotent to change the
common law of procedure, or to amend and abrogate any general
rules of court that may have been promulgated.
If the only thing in New York that saves the constitutionality
of the Field Code of 1848 is the special provision in the Consti-
tution of 1846, then it necessarily follows that much of the very.
important legislation enacted at Albany on December 10, 1828,
which went into effect January 1, 1830, was unconstitutional.
Part of this legislation related to civil procedure and part of it
related to criminal procedure. Some of it was declaratory of the
common law of procedure, but a great deal was in derogation of
the common law. The common law and equity reports of the New
York Supreme Court of Judicature and the Chancery Court, fol-
lowing 1930, contain many references to this legislation of 1828.
In every instance the court enforced the new statutes when in
141. Art. VI, sec. 24.
142. Smith-Hurd Rev. Stat. of 1935, c. 110, sees. 125-263.
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conflict with the common law or the traditional equity practice.
In an early case 42a the court said: "This is the common law rule
and under it an action of trover would not lie against the execu-
tor for property converted by the testator. But by our statute,
1 R. L. 311, 12, the action of trespass is given by and against
executors and administrators for property taken and converted
by the testator or intestate in his lifetime." Other pertinent cases
are cited in the footnote.143 A cursory survey of the legislation
of December 10, 1828, will reveal many changes in the common
law of civil procedure. The action of replevin was extended and
detinue was abolished. The writ of error was made available for
chancery cases. Equitable relief was allowed a plaintiff in eject-
ment when the defendant was committing waste.
Radical changes were made in the common law of criminal
procedure. The writ of error was made a writ of right in
many cases where it had been discretionary under the common
law of New York. The common law of venue was modified,
probably in view of extensive navigation on the Hudson River,
bounded on each side by relatively small counties. Certiorari was
extended to review proceedings when the attorney-general alleged
errors of laws on the record proper. The judges of the New York
courts at that time gave no indication that they possessed any
power to make these changes by rule of court or that they re-
garded the legislators at Albany as usurpers. No law book
printed in New York State has been found in which there is any
hint of unconstitutionality in connection with legislation govern-
ing the fundamentals of procedure until the case of Hanna v.
Mitchell'" was decided and the remarkable dictum was uttered
142a. People v. Gibbs, 9 Wend. (24 N. Y. C. L.) 29, 33 (1832).
143. People v. Van Eps, 4 Wend. (21 N. Y. C. L.) 387 (1830); People v.
Phelps, 5 Wend. (22 N. Y. C. L.) 1 (1830); People ex rel. Bailey v. Hoff-
man, 7 Wend. (23 N. Y. C. L.) 489 (1832) ; People e-x rel. Pratt v. Alberty,
11 Wend. (25 N. Y. C. L.) 160 (1834); Wilder v. Ember, 12 Wend. (25
N. Y. C. L.) 191 (1834). The case of In re Frits, 2 Paige (N. Y. Ch.)
374 (1831), involved careful construction of a procedural statute and
Chancellor Walworth concluded there was no change from the earlier prac-
tice, but raised no question as to power of the legislature to make a change
in equity practice.
144. 196 N. Y. Supp. 43, 51 (1922). Judge Selden of the New York
Court of Appeals, eighty years ago was unsympathetic toward the Field
Code. Two of his opinions have been cited (in an excellent article, Paul,
The Rule-Making Power of the Courts (1926) 1 Wash. L. Rev. 163) as
rendering "dicta to the effect that the legislature had no power to touch
the rules of court," (op. cit., p. 223). These cases are Rubens v. Joel, 13
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that the Code of 1848 would have been unconstitutional if it had
not been for section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution of 1846.
The various opinions in Kolkman v. People'4 5 contain, as Dean
Wigmore has said, "a mine of information."'416 The issue as to
rule-making power was simple. In 1913, the legislature passed
a statute as follows: "The Supreme Court shall prescribe rules
of practice and procedure in all courts of record and may change
or rescind the same. Such rules shall supersede any statute in
conflict therewith." 1"4 In 1929, before the trial of Kolkman, the
Supreme Court adopted its Rule 14b, which in effect re-estab-
lished the common-law right of every trial judge to comment on
the evidence. Of course the rule was valid. But the majority in
the Kolkman case gave its support to this dictum: "Aside from
any common law right or statutory grant, the power to make
rules of procedure is our constitutional right.' 4 8 In an earlier
case l" the same court, speaking through the same judge, said:
"We seriously question the power of the legislature to make any
rules or to enact any law with reference to procedure in courts
of record unless that power had been expressly or tacitly surren-
dered to it by the judiciary." This view of a Colorado judge, ex-
pressed sixteen years after full superstatutory rule-making
power had been conferred upon his court, is interesting but not
particularly impressive in the absence of any state or federal
decision in support of the Colorado view of an academic question.
State ex rel. Foster-Wyman Co. v. Superior Court50 is some-
times cited as in support of the doctrine of inherent and exclusive
judicial rule-making power in procedural matters. A reading of
the case will show that the court did nothing more than politely
recognize "the argument" and forthwith refuse "to further delve
N. Y. 488 (1856) and Voorhis v. Childs' Ex., 17 N. Y. 354 (1858). It is
submitted in the first place that Judge Selden was thinking not about 'ules
of court, but about rules of law. In the second place, it is submitted that
he was concerned only with the constitutionality of a union of law and
equity. Judge Selden did not deny the power of the legislature to enact
statutes of procedure in common law actions and statutes of procedure for
equitable suits.
145. 89 Colo. 8, 300 Pac. 575 (1931). For a judicious comment see 27
Ill. L. Rev. 664 (1933).
146. Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1934 Supp.) sec. 2551a.
147. Quoted in Walton v. Walton, 86 Colo. 1, 21, 278 Pac. 780, 787 (1929).
148. 89 Colo. 8, 32, 300 Pac. 575, 584 (1931).
149. Walton v. Walton, 86 Colo. 1, 21, 278 Pac. 780, 787 (1929).
150. 148 Wash. 1, 267 Pac. 770 (1928).
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into" it, because "the point here in controversy can be decided
upon a far more stable foundation."'5'1 The point was as to the
validity of a court-made rule of practice adopted in 1927 after a
legislative delegation in 1925 of power to promulgate rules of
court to the end that "all laws in conflict therewith shall be and
become of no further force or effect.' 15 2
State v. Roy 53 definitely held that a statute of 1933, delegating
to the Supreme Court of New Mexico superstatutory rule-making
power was constitutional. The zealous attorney-general, cau-
tiously fearful of some technical infirmity in the statute, had
raised the point that the Supreme Court had inherent power to
do what had been done, independently of the statute. The court
said: "Whether the legislative branch of government was ever
rightfully in the rule-making field, or was a mere trespasser or
usurper, need not now be determined.' 15 4
An effective essay by Dean Pound has been put forward as
support for the doctrine of inherent and exclusive judicial rule-
making power in American state supreme courts." There is not
a sentence in the essay to justify such an inference. The essay
is, first, an argument in favor of the wisdom of placing the power
in the judiciary, and, second, an argument for the constitutional-
ity of a statute in Ohio (or any other state) transferring the
power to the judiciary.
Nine years ago Dean Wigmore published an impish editorial
in a law review announcing in Caliph-of-Bagdad style that all
American procedural statutes and codes are, and always have
been, unconstitutional and void.5 61  No judicial authority was
cited. The argument was based on "logic" and "policy". Of
course this essay was not intended to be taken as a serious legal
151. 148 Wash. 1, 5, 267 Pac. 770, 771 (1928).
152. Quoted in 148 Wash. 1, 4, 267 Pac. 770, 771 (1928).
153. 40 N. Mex. 397, 60 P. (2d) 646 (1936).
154. 40 N. Mex. 397, 419, 60 P. (2d) 646, 661 (1936). The court based
its holding partly upon "inherent power" but expressly refrained from
asserting that it has inherent power, without an enabling act, to enforce
rules of court in conflict with statutes. Such a question -was said to be
"academic" in New Mexico, and "should not be determined in advance of
necessity," 1. c. 420.
155. Pound, Regulation of Judicial Procedure by Rules of Court (1915)
10 Ill. L. Rev. 163.
156. Note, 23 Ill. L. Rev. 276 (1928).
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argument.'57 The essay has done good by stimulating historical
research and, more important, by converting many lawyers to
the wisdom and constitutionality of the plan for a legislative
transfer of procedural rule-making power to the judiciary.
No one in the country is more familiar with procedural defects
and procedural reforms than Professor Sunderland. In a judi-
cious public address delivered by him four years ago, not a word
was uttered suggesting that the courts have inherent power to
amend and repeal legislative codes and practice acts. 58
In the past eight years other law review articles have appeared
which were intended to be serious legal arguments in favor of
the novel notion that American courts, without any grant of
power by constitutional provision or statutory enactment, can
constitutionally formulate, promulgate and enforce rules of pro-
cedure in contravention of statutes. 59 The authors of these ar-
ticles manifest several characteristics in common. (1) They
show a laudable desire to bring about a much-needed reform in
American jurisprudence. (2) They fail to realize that strong
desire influences the emotions, and emotions sometimes have an
adverse effect upon reasoning power. (3) They confuse rules of
court with rules of law. (4) They confuse substatutory rules
with superstatutory rules. (5) They fail to appreciate the differ-
ence between the duty of the judiciary to protect its judicial
power and the duty of the court to decide law-suits. (6) They
fail to realize that an argument for the constitutionality of a
statute granting superstatutory rule-making power to the courts
is very different from an argument that no statute is needed to
157. Tyler, Origin of Rule-Making Power (1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 772,
773, f. n. 5. This splendid article is by a lawyer who knows his history as
well as his cases.
158. Sunderland, Progress Toward a Better Administration of Justice
(1933) 17 Jour. Am. Jud. Soc. 49.
159. Editorial, Who Shall Control Criminal Procedure? (1929) 13 Jour.
Am. Jud. Soc. 107; note, 8 Ore. L. Rev. 184 (1929); Panter, The Inherent
Power of Courts to Formulate Rules of Practice (1935) 29 Ill. L. Rev. 911;
Editorial, Power of Courts to Promulgate Rules for Inferior Courts (1935)
69 U. S. L. Rev. 1, reprinted 6 Mo. Bar J. 37 (1935); Editorial, Rule-
Making Authority in Missouri (1936) 19 Jour. Am. Jud. Soc. 166; Gertner,
Inherent Power of Courts to Make Rules (1936) 10 U. of Cin. L. Rev. 32;
Wheaton, Courts and the Rule-Making Powers (1936) 1 Mo. L. Rev. 261,
reprinted 14 Tenn. L. Rev. 448 (1937); Wheaton, Procedural Improvements
and the Rule-Making Power of our Courts (1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 642; Robin-
son, Self-Help or Self-Destruction? The Rule-Making Power (1937) 9
Rocky Mountain L. Rev. 122.
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enable courts to promulgate superstatutory rules of procedure.
Aaron Burr used to say that law is anything boldly asserted
and plausibly maintained. Only in Aaron Burr's sense can the
doctrine of this section be regarded as law.
SECTION 10: THE DOCTRINE OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
STATUTES GRANTING TO THE JUDICIARY THE POWER TO
MAKE RULES OF PROCEDURE IN CONTRAVENTION OF
STATUTES.
When the movement for establishing superstatutory rule-mak-
ing power in the judiciary started in this country about thirty
years ago, the chief objection was based upon the alleged un-
constitutionality of the proposal. It was believed by many able
lawyers that since procedural regulation in the Anglo-American
system had been the subject of legislation for centuries, there-
fore the function of creating the more important rules for the
conduct of litigation was essentially and exclusively a legisla-
tive function. It was believed and asserted by many able lawyers
that just as the legislature could not delegate to the courts the
duty of making substantive law in the fields of contracts, torts
and crimes, so the legislature could not delegate to the courts the
duty of making new laws relating to grounds for a demurrer, or
the joinder of parties plaintiff in a tort action, or simplifying
the allegations in an indictment.
The leaders in advocating a superstatutory rule-making power
in the courts combated this particular argument by showing that
a great deal of rule-making power had always been in the courts;
that the scope of judicial rule-making power in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries was much greater than in the nine-
teenth century; that the scope of rule-making power was much
greater in the first third of the nineteenth century than in the
latter third; that the legislative experiments had not been com-
pletely successful from a practical viewpoint. Their chief and
constant argument was that a delegation to the courts of the
power of making superstatutory rules of procedure would not
be an unconstitutional proceeding on the part of the legislature,
because on analytical grounds and to a lesser extent on historical
grounds the devising of such rules is judicial, or at least quasi-
judicial, in nature. They invoked the liberal and co-ordinating
theory of interpreting the constitutional dogma of the three
powers.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol22/iss4/2
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It is unnecessary at this time to go into the details of the pro-
tracted controversy over the question of whether the legislature
can delegate superstatutory rule-making power to the courts.1 0
The death of an able, sincere, beloved but somewhat obstinate
member of the United States Senate was a factor in the final
triumph so far as Congress was concerned. The matter may now
be regarded as settled in American jurisprudence. Congress has
actually delegated superstatutory rule-making power to the Su-
preme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court is now
acting on the theory that the delegation is constitutional.
The legislatures of ten states have passed statutes in the nature
of grants of power authorizing the courts to make superstatutory
rules of procedure. The constitutionality of some of these stat-
utes has been very carefully considered. Thorough and illumi-
nating opinions have been written upholding the constitutionality
of this twentieth-century legislation.
The Colorado Act of 1913, granting to the Supreme Court the
power to make "rules of practice and procedure in all courts of
record" expressly stated that "such rules shall supersed any
statute in conflict therewith."'161 At the time the act was passed,
the statutory period for issuing a writ of error was three years.
In 1917, the Supreme Court by a rule reduced the period to two
years. It was over this new rule that the first contest as to the
validity of the enabling act was presented to the Supreme Court
in the case of Ernst v. Lamb.162 The plaintiff in error, barred
by the rule but not by the statute, contended that the act of 1913
was unconstitutional as an effort to delegate legislative power,
and that the rule was void because it attempted to change a stat-
ute of limitation as if it were a matter of procedure. Both points
were ruled against the plaintiff in error. 63
State ex Tel. Foster-Wyman Lumber Co. v. Superior Court",
was the test case for the enabling act in the State of Washington.
The chief ground of attack was the asserted inability of a legis-
160. For historical surveys see Tolman, Address (1936) 22 A. B. A. 3.
783, and Wigmore, Address (1936) 22 A. B. A. J. 811.
161. Quoted in Walton v. Walton, 86 Colo. 1, 21, 278 Pac. 780, 787
(1929).
162. 73 Colo. 132, 213 Pac. 994 (1923).
163. To the same effect: Walton v. Walton, 86 Colo. 1, 278 Pac. 780
(1929) ; Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 300 Pac. 575 (1931).
164. 148 Wash. 1, 267 Pac. 770 (1928).
19371
Washington University Open Scholarship
508 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 22
lature constitutionally to delegate its legislative power to the
judiciary. In a well-considered opinion upholding a new rule in
contravention of an earlier statute, the Supreme Court said:
"The legislature, although formerly functioning in this state as
the source of rules of practice and procedure in the courts, did
not, is so doing, perform an act exclusively legislative, and may,
if it so desires, transfer that power to the courts without such
an act being a delegation of legislative power." i6 The most sig-
nificant language of the enabling act was the following sentence:
"When and as the rules of court herein authorized shall be pro-
mulgated, all laws in conflict therewith shall be and become of
no further force or effect.'166
The Wisconsin enabling act was paraphrased in the case of
In. re Constitutionality of Statute.6 7 The chief objection was the
classic one based upon the constitutional division of powers and
the inability of one of the three departments to delegate its power
to another one of the three. The court adopted the prevailing
American view of a liberal construction of the ancient formula,
and then held that the "power to regulate procedure, at the time
of the adoption of the [Wisconsin] constitution, was considered
to be essentially a judicial power, or at least not strictly a legis-
lative power, and that there is no constitutional objection to the
delegation of it to the courts by the legislature."'," The most
significant part of the Wisconsin act was the following language:
"All statutes relating to pleading, practice and procedure shall
have force and effect only as rules of court and shall remain in
effect unless and until modified or suspended by rules promul-
gated pursuant hereto."' 69
New Mexico's test case was State v. Roy.17° The gist of the
court's opinion was succinctly stated as follows: "It is sufficient
here to hold that when the Legislature enacted chapter 84, [of
the enabling act of 1933] it did not delegate to this court a func-
tion exclusively legislative contrary to section 1, art. 3, of our
Constitution," which provides for the orthodox three-fold sepa-
165. 148 Wash. 1, 9, 267 Pac. 770, 773 (1928).
166. 148 Wash. 1, 4, 267 Pac. 770, 771 (1928).
167. 204 Wis. 501, 236 N. W. 717 (1931).
168. 204 Wis. 501, 510, 236 N. W. 717, 720-721 (1931).
169. 204 Wis. 501, 502, 236 N. W. 717, 718 (1931).
170. 40 N. Mex. 397, 60 P. (2d) 646 (1936).
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ration of governmental powers." 1 Apparently no serious ques-
tion as to any unconstitutional delegation of legislative power has
arisen in Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Maryland, New Jersey or
West Virginia, where statutes authorize superstatutory rules of
court. The important Wisconsin case1" 2 already mentioned was
decided by a unanimous court and the opinion was written by
Judge Wickhem. He gives the following exposition of the pur-
pose of the legislature and what should be the attitude of the
courts:
"The law is intended to free the courts from the obliga-
tion to follow precedent, which is assumed to have been a
major factor in prior failures of courts successfully to regu-
late procedure, and, on the other hand, to relieve against the
inflexibility and difficulty of repeal or modification, which
has constituted the principal objection to regulation by leg-
islative code. * * * In the field dealt with by this section
there has been a demand for reform-a demand far too in-
sistent to indicate anything less than a corresponding need.
The duty of governmental bodies to respond to such demands
is self-evident. It is also self-evident that such response as
is made must be in accordance with orderly processes and
must be in conformance to constitutional limitations. The
co-ordinate branches of the government, even in the face of
such demands, should not abdicate or permit others to in-
fringe upon such powers as are exclusively committed to
them by the constitution. As to the exercise of those powers,
however, which are not exclusively committed to them, there
should be such generous co-operation as will tend to keep
the law responsive to the needs of society. This co-opera-
tion is peculiarly necessary today because the complexities
of modern life and its problems make it increasingly diffi-
cult accurately to predict the value and effect of particular
procedures, and increasingly necessary to move by a method
of trial and error."' 73
171. 40 N. Mex. 397, 420, 60 P. (2d) 646, 660. The court relied on the
following cases: In re Constitutionality of Statute, 204 Wis. 501, 236 N. W.
717 (1931); State ex rel. Inspection Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472, 220
N. W. 929 (1928); Hampton v. U. S., 276 U. S. 394, 48 S. Ct. 348, 72 L.
ed. 624 (1928); Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 253 (1825);
State ex rel. Foster-Wyman Lumber Co. v. Superior Court, 148 Wash. 1,
267 Pac. 770 (1928).
172. In re Constitutionality of Statute, 204 Wis. 501, 236 N. W. 717
(1931).
173. 204 Wis. 501, 513-514, 236 N. W. 717, 722 (1931).
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